

VII MARRIAGE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Summary

- *Marriage continues to be universal and stable but far from unchanging*
- *Age at marriage has increased slightly but continues to be low. The important trend is not that age at marriage is stubborn but that positive outcomes in fertility and education have obtained despite low age at marriage*
- *In a marriage regime that traditionally did not take the brides' views into account, we now find that younger women have a lot more say in decisions regarding their marriage*
- *Dowry is the new preoccupation of girls and their families and Bangladesh has changed from regime of bride price to one of dowry in thirty-odd years*
- *Educated girls do not seem to need to pay dowry as long as they are not more educated than their husbands*
- *Poverty may indeed be associated with dowry as the popular perceptions suggest*
- *Despite these general patterns and findings, there are great variations in marriage across the country*
- *Not much is known about how policy can directly promote better outcomes for gender equality in marriage*

A Context

7.1 In Bangladesh almost everyone gets married and for the most part, stays married. Polygamy, divorce and cross-cousin marriages are uncommon, although abandonment of women is quite common and does not show up in surveys. Women marry very young, or it would be more appropriate to say that their parents marry get them married young - for marriages are mostly arranged. Age at marriage has remained low at about 16 years. In that respect marriage patterns in Bangladesh are not unlike those in India or Nepal.

7.2 If marriage is universal and stable, why is it important? As an anthropological and sociological issue, marriage is important in its own right. But from a development policy and gender and development perspective, its importance lies in the fact that it is the boundary within which women's lives are ordained. Whether and what kind of health care they use, whether they can access market opportunities like employment or credit, whether they can vote independently, whether they can move freely outside their homes and a number of other processes and outcomes depend to a large extent on their marital status and within that, on the type of marriage. In the analysis of violence we find that dowry is associated with greater spousal violence against women.

7.3 Changes in marriage patterns and attitudes, such as increasing numbers of women marrying men less educated than them, women's rights to property within marriage and attitudes to educational equality in marriage have been discussed in other chapters. The changes we describe in other chapters are for the most part taking place within the context of marriage, since almost all women are married by the time they are 20 years old. Even when we are not discussing changes, the patterns we describe in other chapters underscore the importance of marriage. For instance, the labor market chapter shows the depressing effect of marriage on women's labor force participation. Conversely, equality in the marital relationship is associated with women's greater voice in family decision-making as we have demonstrated in the chapter on norms and decision-making. This chapter focuses on the issues of low age at marriage, increased voice of women in the choice of their grooms and the spiraling dowry rates.

7.4 Bangladesh is a bit of puzzle in the arena of marriage as well. The conventional focus of demographers on increasing age at marriage as an important corollary of fertility decline and increasing labor force participation does not hold. The important development in Bangladesh is not that median age at marriage has remained low (although there have been some improvements in the last decade) but that

education has improved and fertility dropped **despite** low age at marriage¹⁷⁰. Yet, a large majority of girls marry very young (before the age of 15) and when combined with large age gap between spouses, this has negative effects on their life chances and on the high probability that they live for several years as widows.¹⁷¹

7.5 One of the major concerns of those working on women's rights and social change is about spiraling dowry rates. Dowry is an un-Islamic practice, although a common Hindu one, and seems to have really increased in Bangladesh in the last 30 years. Some changes have driven a culture that relied on brideprice (*pon*) to change to dowry (*joutuk*). In other chapters we have empirically shown that the association of dowry with violence and decision-making is negative and this confirms popular perceptions of dowry, but it is difficult to understand what is influencing this change.

7.6 Our main dilemma is that while we can study the effect of marriage on various outcomes, we are often unsure about what policy can do to directly change the nature of marriage even when we find some aspect of marriage to be associated with poor outcomes. Family policy in developed countries like the US addresses marriage and civil unions directly to ensure equity and welfare within the family; but in countries like Bangladesh where marriage is governed for the most part by religious law, doctrine and customs, policy can have only indirect effect. Thus, the condition in the FSSSP that girls remain unmarried while they attend secondary school to be able to avail of the stipend had an effect on educational outcomes, but also perhaps indirectly on marriage. Another example is the drive that NGOs and government undertook to ensure that marriages were registered and which resulted in almost a doubling of registrations over two cohorts of women 15-25 and 45-60 years of age¹⁷². Some small scale studies show that young garment workers manage to delay marriage as a result of market opportunities¹⁷³.

7.7 **Objectives, Data and Methods:** The links between different aspects of marriage and women's status has been explored under various themes in different parts of this report, notably in education, decision-making and violence. We also touch upon change in attitudes of older and younger women in several parts of the report and issues related to marriage are covered as well.

7.8 This chapter has two areas of focus. The *first* focus is to track changes in marriage patterns related to women's status over time. For this we use two aspects of marriage – age at marriage and whether woman had a say in the choice of spouse. For the first time, we have a data set that posed questions on marriage from this perspective and we can determine nationally representative patterns. Earlier studies have been based on small samples, the methods have largely been qualitative and have not asked the range of questions that the WBGNS 2006 has.

7.9 Our *second* focus is on dowry. We have tried to empirically understand some of the questions that have captured the public imagination and which emerge as being important for both policy and for ordinary people as gathered from focus groups. Integrating the quantitative evidence with the qualitative, we use the insights from focus group discussions to offer some speculations but few answers to the patterns and hope that future investigations will take the empirical discourse further.

B Age at Marriage and Women's Voice in Decisions

7.10 The chapter on norms, decision-making and participation has laid out the changes that have taken place in Bangladesh. For women, most of these changes have occurred within marriage, since most

¹⁷⁰ See for instance, Amin et al (2006).

¹⁷¹ Widowhood confers low status on women and women's welfare depends to a large extent on the marital status.

¹⁷² Almost 85 percent of marriages in the younger cohort are registered (WBGNS 2006)

¹⁷³ Amin (1998)

women are married by the time they are 20 years old. This chapter addresses three salient issues in marriage – age at marriage, increased voice in decisions about their own marriage and the spiraling dowry rates.

Figure 7.1: Age at first marriage and fertility rate, Demographic and Health Surveys, Phase III, Multiple Countries.





Figure 7.2: Age at Marriage and School Attendance



7.11 The important trend in Bangladesh is not that age at marriage is stubborn but that positive outcomes have obtained despite low age at marriage: According to the most recent BDHS (2004) median age at first marriage rose from 13.9 years for women aged 45-49 to 16.0 years for those aged 20-24. For these same cohorts, the proportion of women marrying very early by age 15 declined by almost half over time, from 71 percent (cohort aged 45-49) to 37 percent among women aged 20-24. During the 1990s, the proportion marrying early dropped from 73% in 1993-94 to 65% in 1999-2000 But rose again slightly to 68 percent in 2004¹⁷⁴. These trends from the DHS series indicate that while the incidence of very early child marriages has declined, the majority of women continue to marry under the age of 18 and the legal minimum age limits continue to be routinely ignored.

7.12 Demographers expect change in age at marriage change to typically precede fertility decline based on the experience of most historical and contemporary societies. But fertility in Bangladesh is far lower than would be expected at these levels of age at marriage. The persistence of relatively early marriage in a context of dramatic change in other social indicators means that, relative to other societies, the Bangladeshi age pattern of marriage is anomalous.

7.13 Similarly, Bangladesh attained near universal school attendance in 2000. Figure 7.1

shows the result of a regression correlation between age at marriage and school attendance for 25 DHS countries at comparable years for which data on both variables are available. Countries that have comparable levels of schooling (India, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua) have ages at first marriage over 18 years. On the other hand, in countries that have similarly low mean age at marriage (Mali and Guinea) the proportions attending schooling are only around 20 percent¹⁷⁵.

7.14 Women’s voice in decisions related to their marriage is increasing. As we have noted earlier, marriages are mostly arranged between families of brides and grooms. Lack of voice of girls in their

¹⁷⁴ DHS various years

¹⁷⁵ Amin at al (2006)

marriage is symptomatic of the lack of voice they have in their lives. But this seems to be undergoing a change as well.

7.15 Overall a little more than one third (35 percent) of all the women interviewed in the WBGNS 2006 said they had some say in the choice of husband when they were first married. There were important variations by cohort and region. Among older women (age 45-60) the proportion was 20 percent and rose to 52 percent for younger women (age 15-25). There are large differences by region—among older women the proportion saying their opinion was taken varied from 7 percent in Rajshahi to 37 percent in Chittagong. Among the younger cohort the variation was 42 percent in Khulna to 77 percent in Barisal saying they had some opinion in the choice of their partner.


7.16 The remarkable increase in the proportion of women who report having a say in the choice of husband does not mean that they knew their husbands. Almost 80 percent of all respondents said they met their husband for the first time at their wedding. This pattern did not change much over time – 82 percent for the older cohort and 76 percent for the younger cohort. This is not entirely inexplicable since women who have a say in the choice of the husband do not necessarily meet them.

7.17 For a girl to even be involved in the discussion around prospective grooms is a positive step in a culture where girls have historically had no say in when and to whom they were married. Insights from focus group discussions also indicate that seeking and accepting the view of daughters regarding their marriages has become much more common now than it was earlier. In the education chapter we saw that focus groups indicated that the most important change in the lives of young women due to education has been in “voice” and “loss of shyness”. This is a recurrent theme in the discussions on marriage as well.

7.18 Traditionally girls are supposed to display appropriate “shyness” in any conversation regarding their marriage. Now, it appears that there is greater acceptance of girls who do not display such behavior and have a view on the choice of their husbands.

“Girls now express their opinion about their marriage...if they have a choice they tell their mothers or sister-in-laws. This was beyond the imagination 20 years back.” Mother of young girl in Sunamgonj during focus group discussions

“Earlier girls could not express their willingness (regarding choice of groom), but now they do. They can now ...even marry as per their choice. We don’t create any pressure on them or force them to marry someone. We think they have become educated - they understand what is good for them” Elite men (fathers of girls) in Mymensingh during focus group discussions



The following statement by young men in Dinajpur is also instructive of changes:

“Earlier girls never used to call their husbands by their name, but now they do”

7.19 Some patterns in women’s voice seem contrary to each other and sometimes to other sections in the report. As an example, when we discussed aspirations of young girls in the education chapter we found them voicing submissive views when it came to their marriages, indicating that they would marry men of their parents’ choice. This was in the context of their aspirations for jobs. It is entirely likely that when women and girls voice an aspiration that seems contrary to or challenging a norm (such as a vocal desire for market jobs), they accompany that aspiration with a submissive attitude to another related norm. In order to counter resistance that may arise based on a widely held view that employed women break traditions and make bad wives and daughters-in-law, young women show submissive attitudes on the latter, so that they can achieve their employment aspirations.

C Dowry - The New Preoccupation of Parents of Girls

7.20 Measurement of the amount of dowry suffers from the same pitfalls as measuring income does and it is almost impossible to get reliable figures. The WBGNS 2006 did however ask the question in a number of ways – respondents were asked if certain durable goods were given by them or were usually given in their community. They were also asked about wedding expenditures and cash dowry amounts. We do not use those in this section, but create a categorical variable – whether or not dowry was paid based on whether goods or cash of Tk 500 or above were given in response to demand by the grooms’ family for the younger cohort.

7.21 **Dowry is indeed increasing.** The important issue in Bangladesh is not of dowry inflation per se, but that dowry was hardly ever prevalent in Muslim families. For the first time we are able to assess whether the anecdotal evidence of increasing prevalence of dowry is correct. We found from our data set that dowry was practically non-existent in the older cohort of women – only 7.7 percent of these women (and the majority were Hindu) compared to over 46 percent of younger women had to pay dowry at their weddings¹⁷⁶.

Box 7.1: The new face of bride-price Compensating migration

Almost every focus group in Sunamgonj (Sylhet) indicated that “reverse dowry” is common if it provides grooms with a legal entry into the UK. Sylhet is traditionally a sending area for migrants to UK and the Middle East. Aspirations of young men especially are to migrate and marriage is an important route to migration. We see this also in the discussions on education and aspirations in general. London-based girls and their families demand payment for a marriage that helps the groom to migrate.

“Brides who live in London demand a huge amount of money and gold from bridegroom. This can also be called dowry”. Elite women in Sunamgonj during focus group discussions

“If the bride is a ‘London citizen’ and groom local, the bride’s father demands Tk. 5 –10 lakhs”. Father of young girl in Sunamgonj during focus group discussions

“‘Londoni’ daughters demand cash, house or car in their name. But local girls do not demand. Some educated girls demand a few things.” Mother of young girls in Sunamgonj during focus group discussions

¹⁷⁶ Amin (2006b) cites two village studies that noted a switch from brideprice (payments by groom to bride) to dowry (payment by brides to grooms) that took place sometime in the 1960s (Lindenbaum, 1981 cited in Amin, 2006; Amin and Cain, 1997). These reported changes are similar to trends observed in non-dowry societies in parts of India (Caldwell, Caldwell and Reddy, 1983; Rao, 1991 cited in Amin 2006b).

7.22 “Pon” was a system of bride price that existed until about 30 years ago in Muslim marriages in Bangladesh. When asked whether they had ever heard of the practice of bride price or “pon”, focus groups comprising older participants had done so but not many of the younger participants had.

“There was “pon” about 30 years ago, now it does not exist. ‘Pon’ was a good system. Women could benefit through ‘pon’. Men offered land or cash to the bride”. Elite women in Sunamgonj during focus group discussions

“I heard from my grandmother that my grandfather gave ‘pon’ to marry her.....the amount of ‘pon’ was 20 taka. Now the situation has changed.” Young woman in Satkhira during focus group discussions

Both men and women, but mostly married women, were eager to talk about dowry and the problems of getting daughters married. In fact, it was sometimes difficult to steer conversation away from dowry, indicating how prominent it is in the minds of people.

“In my marriage, I was given some ornaments by my father, relatives and husband’s parents. My father gave some clothes to my husband. They (husband’s family) did not demand anything....now we cannot imagine such a thing”. Elite woman (mother of adolescent girl) in Dinajpur during focus group discussions


“Just 10 years back it was possible to marry daughters with a small amount of dowry i.e. about 10-20 thousand Taka, and some ornaments. Now the bridegroom’s side demands motorbike, refrigerator, color TV, box-khat (bed) etc.” Elite woman (mother of adolescent girl) in Dinajpur during focus group discussions

“There was no dowry system in Pakistan period....rather there was great demand for girls. After 1971, dowry system appeared due to poverty.” Elite men (fathers of girls) in Mymensingh during focus group discussions

“No dowry was required in my marriage but for my daughter’s marriage a motor-cycle has been demanded as dowry.” Young girl’s mother from poor background in Satkhira during focus group discussions

7.23 **What is dowry? Is there a common understanding?** A number of insights emerge from focus groups regarding marriage transactions as well. The first is that there is great variation in the prevalence of dowry even though it has increased dramatically across two cohorts of women. Second, marriage transactions are not limited to dowry and the complexity of these transactions is well-understood in the

Figure 7.4
Bangladesh: The practice of dowry has increased over time
 Source: World Bank Gender Norms Survey 2006
 (based on whether dowry worth Tk500 or above was paid)



popular discourse. That these transactions are not always clean-cut is also demonstrated in our focus group discussions. Marriage negotiations are not one-sided and entail the possibility that parents of the prospective bride will also make some demands on the parents of the prospective groom. This is often called “*dabi-dewa*” and is contingent on the relative status of the two families and the attributes of the girl and boy. Thus, girls with darker skin tones or older girls have less leverage and have to pay out more as dowry. On the other hand, if the boy is unemployed, his father may have to give more jewelry to the girl. Similarly, as box 7.1 shows, when the boy uses marriage as an avenue to migrate, he has to compensate the girl’s family for it. What seems to be well-understood is that while gift giving in marriage is usual, when gifts are not given voluntarily but in response to coercion by the grooms’ family they are called dowry.

“If an educated girl marries an unemployed boy her parents want money from him. If a motor cycle is demanded by the groom’s parents, jewelry is demanded by bride”. Young girl’s mother Sunamgonj during focus group discussions

7.24 Explanations for dowry¹⁷⁷:

Research on the determinants of dowry focus on two broad themes - the first dealing with the existence of marriage payments (i.e. dowry or brideprice)¹⁷⁸ and the second dealing with the recent surge in the level of dowry payments in South Asia. The trend of rising dowries, has received much attention, as payments can represent several years' worth of a family's income and often cause severe destitution of households with daughters of marriageable age¹⁷⁹.

	Weighted Mean	Odds Ratio
Wife equal or more educated than husband	0.66	1.35**
Respondent primary educated	0.31	0.98
Respondent post-primary educated	0.46	0.62**
Barisal	0.06	0.49**
Chittagong	0.16	1.08
Khulna	0.13	0.65**
Rajshahi	0.28	2.92***
Sylhet	0.06	0.20***
Assetquin2	0.22	0.74
Assetquin3	0.18	0.63**
Assetquin4	0.20	0.59**
Assetquin5	0.20	0.34***
Age at first marriage	15.14	1.03
In-laws better off than natal family	0.20	1.00
Currently employed	0.13	1.30
Note: ***p>.001 **p>.01		
Note2: Some non-significant controls not reported		

7.25 Theories about dowry most favored by demographers relate rising dowry and dowry inflation to the notion of a “*marriage squeeze*”¹⁸⁰ or a surplus of women. They attribute this “surplus” to declining mortality and age patterns of marriage where men marry women who are considerably younger than them. Declining mortality means that younger cohorts are larger than older cohorts, which with the persistence of large age differences in marriage, leads to a surplus of marriageable females. Marriage squeeze cannot explain why dowry inflation has persisted despite an equalization of cohort sizes. In fact,

¹⁷⁷ This literature review draws heavily from Amin (2006b)

¹⁷⁸ Dowry (also referred to in the literature as *groomprice*) refers to payments made to the groom and his family by the bride’s family while brideprice refers to payments made in the opposite direction.

¹⁷⁹ Deolalikar and Rao (1998) cited in Amin (2006b)

¹⁸⁰ A notion introduced in the literature by Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1983). At least two studies on Bangladesh cited by Amin (2006b) viz. Lindenbaum (1983) and Amin and Cain (1997) reported that popular explanations also attribute the emergence of dowry to a surplus of potential brides.

demographic projections have pointed to an easing of the marriage squeeze¹⁸¹ - yet high dowry payments have persisted.

7.26 A related argument explaining dowry is based on female competition¹⁸². Rather than a numerical shortage, it emphasizes that the rise of dowry in Bangladesh is a reflection of increased competition for high-quality grooms. The competition gains momentum as opportunities for work and education increase for men. In other words, dowry is a means of upward mobility for daughters and by association, their natal families. Under these assumptions, it has been argued that a more correct term for dowry would be *groomprice*.

7.27 The competing explanation to “marriage squeeze” is that dowry is a form of pre-mortem inheritance or a “bequest”¹⁸³. Therefore, dowry, rather than a social ill that is detrimental to the lives and families of young women, is viewed as something that can actually help the bride.


7.28 Yet another explanation that arises from an understanding of the Bangladeshi society and economic changes is that Bangladesh changed from bride-price to dowry when land holding size reduced and female labor became less valuable. Bride price thus was the means for households to acquire female hands used in agriculture and when this was no longer needed, girls’ families had to compensate those of boys.¹⁸⁴

Determinants of dowry in Bangladesh:

7.29 Using the WBGNS 2006, we undertook a statistical exercise to predict the correlates of dowry. We tried to test the explanations for dowry thrown up in focus group discussions – whether educated girls pay more or less dowry; whether employed girls are a form of “recurring dowry”; whether girls who “marry up” in terms of socioeconomic status and whether poverty is indeed associated with dowry.

7.30 **Educated girls do not need to pay dowry as long as they are less educated than their husbands.** In focus group discussions we found sharply divided opinions on whether educated girls have to pay more dowry or less. Some participants felt that educated girls are a resource to their husbands’ family and may be able to get jobs, and so have to pay lower dowry. Others felt that educated girls need better placed grooms and so the price of groom would go up. We find that girls who have post-primary education are 62 percent less likely to pay dowry only if you control for the fact that they are not more educated than their husbands. Therefore, it is girls who are more educated

Figure 7.5



¹⁸¹ See Bhat and Halli (1999); Amin and Cain (1998)

¹⁸² Lindenbaum (1983)

¹⁸³ Goody (1973). Amin (2006b) cites an empirical study of Taiwanese couples which found that the payment of dowry not only increases the resources of the conjugal household, but also increases a women's bargaining position in her new household (Zhang and Chan 1999). Following that logic Edlund (2001, cited in Amin 2006b) has also argued that dowry inflation can lead to increased welfare of brides.

¹⁸⁴ Khandker (2004)

than their husbands who have to pay more. Post-primary education by itself is seen as a virtue and parents are less likely to pay dowry.

7.31 Poverty may be associated with dowry: The national discourse in Bangladesh links poverty with dowry. We find in our focus group discussions that poor families use dowry to tide over consumption expenditures like the weddings or repairs to homes. More important perhaps is the finding that they use dowry that the son brings in to purchase productive assets such as rickshaws.

“In poor families, the bridegroom himself takes the dowry and uses it for buying rickshaw, van, building house or starting business. In middle class families, generally fathers of bridegrooms keep the dowry.” Elite women in Sunamgonj during focus group discussions

7.32 We find in the statistical analysis that poverty is hugely and significantly associated with dowry. The richest women are only 34 percent as likely as the poorest to pay dowry. With increasing household wealth, the likelihood of paying dowry goes down. But, this may not be as straightforward as it appears. Focus groups explained that poverty is associated with dowry because rich families fulfill expectations of grooms without being asked. In poor families, there are perhaps more negotiations in the marriage transaction.

“Rich families do not demand dowry - they get a lot of dowry without any demand.” Elite women in Sunamgonj during focus group discussions

7.33 We do not find other factors popularly associated with dowry to be significant: As noted earlier, in Bangladesh dowry payments are also sensitive to qualities of the bride, most notably her age and skin tone. Dowry increases with age at marriage, placing pressure on parents to marry their daughters early. This may be especially true if the bride suffers from other disadvantages in the marriage market such as lower social status or darker skin tone¹⁸⁵. We are not able to measure the impact of skin tone, though this came up several times in focus groups, but we do not find age at marriage to be significantly correlated with dowry. This could be because we only consider women 15-25 who would have been married within the “acceptable” age of marriage. Similarly, we do not find employment of women to be significant either. Nor do we find the relative socioeconomic status of the husband’s family and the wife’s natal family to have an important influence. Since this is one of the few analysis that controls for the types of social variables that are commonly considered to be correlated with dowry, we need to supplement this with other analyses to understand better the determinants of dowry and the reasons for its dramatic increase.

D Synthesis and Conclusion

7.34 In this chapter we have argued that marriage is important in its own right as an epistemological issue but its instrumental value from a development policy and gender and development perspective lies in the fact that it is the boundary within which women’s lives are circumscribed. A range of outcomes for women depend on their marital status and within that, on the type of marriage.

7.35 Though still stable and universal, there have been changes in marriage in Bangladesh. Traditionally only age at marriage has been studied and seen as an important outcome, which it is. But we argue that low age at marriage, though important in itself, has not hampered other outcomes and processes like fertility, mortality and education. The main dilemma we face is that while we can study the

¹⁸⁵ Huq and Amin 2001; Islam and Mahmud 1996

effect of marriage on various outcomes, we are unsure about what policy can do to directly change the nature of marriage.

7.36 The new preoccupation in the Bangladeshi countryside is with spiraling dowry rates, the pressure it imposes on women's families and the extent to which it affects their well-being. We have dowry to be associated with a number of factors. Some of these are policy-variant and others are not. Some clear policy conclusions do emerge, on the basis of which we make the following recommendations.

7.37 **Increase access to secondary education for both boys and girls:** We have found secondary education of girls to have a depressing effect on dowry. Therefore, secondary education has an impact on a range of outcomes of which dowry is likely to be one.

7.38 **Step up poverty reduction efforts:** We have also found poverty to be positively correlated with dowry. Focus groups indicate that unemployment among young men may be factor that inflates dowry, when grooms use dowry money to start small businesses. Working on both the employment end and the poverty reduction end would perhaps also have benefits in terms of dowry rates.

7.39 **Learn from the experience of small interventions to reduce dowry:** Unfortunately we know of no large scale interventions that have worked in reducing dowry or on making marriages more equal. However, there are several small scale social reform initiatives in Bangladeshi villages. Program and project personnel need to learn from these and explore possibilities for replication.

7.40 **Design pilot initiatives and evaluate them well:** Since we know so little about what can work to reduce dowry and to increase women's voice in marriage, pilot initiatives based on a combination of awareness-raising, community-wide incentives and support to marriages that do not use dowry could be designed and studied.