



THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

Post-conflict Reconstruction: The Case of Northern Uganda

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List of Acronyms

ABETO	Always Be Tolerant Organisation
ARIs	Acute Respiratory Infections
AIDS	Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
CMOC	Civil Military Operation Centres
CSOPNU	Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda
DFID	Department for International Development
DWD	Directorate of Water Development
ESIP	Education Sector Investment Plan
GOU	Government of Uganda
HIV	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus
HSM	Holy Spirit Movement
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons/People
LDU	Local Defence Unit
LRA	Lords Resistance Army
MFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MOH	Ministry of Health
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MWLE	Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NURP	Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme
PBR	Pupil Book Ratio
PCR	Pupil Classroom Ratio
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PoW	Prisoners of War
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTR	Pupil Teacher Ratio
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
STDs	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UDHS	Uganda Demographic and Health Survey
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
UNLA	Uganda's National Liberation Army
UNRF	Uganda National Rescue Front
UPDCA	Uganda People's Democratic Christians Army
UPDA	Uganda's Peoples Democratic Army
UPPAP	Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Process

Executive Summary

1. Poverty remains significantly high in Northern Uganda despite numerous targeted interventions. While insecurity may be the most important factor explaining this phenomenon, it is plausible that there are other broader social political and economic inequalities that may account for the observed regional inequalities. But the time is also right for looking beyond the ravages of the war to start thinking about reconstruction and rehabilitation. This paper therefore discusses the prevailing regional inequalities and suggests possible avenues for revitalizing the North.
2. Key challenges in the North relate to the peculiarities present in this region. They include the long period of insecurity, large influx of internally displaced persons and refugees, highest levels of poverty, HIV/AIDS threat linked to migrations, human rights challenges and pastoralism.
3. Five phases of rebel insurgency are identified which have led to extreme impoverishment of the people in the North. The Government of Uganda places utmost importance on guaranteeing peace to all Ugandans and hence has undertaken numerous initiatives geared towards ending armed conflict and attaining peace in the North. They include the Amnesty process, diplomacy and peace negotiations, disarmament, involvement of civil society particularly the religious leaders. There are indications of imminent peace from these initiatives but Government also continues to engage in military operations in order to protect the lives and property of the citizenry.
4. Several development initiatives, some targeting the North and others crosscutting in nature have been undertaken to address the numerous problems in the region. Despite these interventions, development outcomes continue to be poor particularly in the most insecure districts of Pader, Kitgum and Gulu as well as large parts of Karamoja. At the same time, it is evident that not all districts in the North are more disadvantaged than other districts in other parts of the country, except in selected aspects. Strategies for post-conflict reconstruction should therefore not be blanket but tailored to suit the circumstances of individual regional entities.
5. Overcoming the challenges in the North is a gigantic task that may not only require massive injection of time and resources but also a clear vision and strategy for moving forward. Strategic Plans are being developed for the North and Karamoja. But these will only be effective when fully embedded in key national policy and budgeting processes, particularly the PEAP, MTEF and sectoral and district investment plans.
6. In the short-run, pursuance of peace and human rights within the region should be top priority while in the medium to long-term, focus must be on growth and development.
7. While special programmes have played a significant role in rehabilitating the North in the past, such interventions should be handled with caution in future as they may isolate the region from mainstream economics and politics with only a few institutions directly involved in the development process.
8. Gradually, the development approach in this region should move from being largely of an emergency nature with high dependency on relief to increasingly becoming

development oriented. Sufficient and well-targeted funding for the process of transition from relief to development is a necessity that would require improved coordination between the key players.

9. A phased approach is proposed for gradually rehabilitating and reconstructing the post conflict districts. In the short-run when military threats are still prevalent, it is inevitable that the military option will continue to prevail but should gradually reduce to give way to peace building. Other interventions that should continue running even in the short to long-term include the diplomatic measures, peace dialogue, amnesty, and psychosocial support to those who are traumatized.
10. Efforts that have started to put in place Strategic Plans for the North and Karamoja should continue and implementation should start thereafter after careful analysis of the most needs of the people in this region and the most appropriate strategies. In the medium term, it is important that resettlement and economic re-integration takes place and ground laid for investments. Ensuring food sufficiency and gainful employment are paramount if the welfare of the poor in the North is to be uplifted.
11. Community and district mobilization for peace and development and capacity building initiatives for the district and army are pre-requisites for good governance and development.
12. While special programmes have played a significant role in rehabilitating the North in the past, such interventions should be handled with caution in future as they may isolate the region from mainstream economics and politics with only a few institutions directly involved in the development process.

1. This paper

Poverty levels remain significantly high in Northern Uganda despite the numerous targeted interventions to reduce poverty in this region over the past decade. Even when income poverty is reported to have fallen elsewhere in the country between 1997 and 2000, poverty levels have remained high in Northern Uganda rising from 60 percent to 66 percent within this period. Overwhelming evidence suggests that insecurity in the region over the last 15 years is the most important explanatory factor for the high poverty incidence as it has resulted in death and human displacement grossly undermining the productive sector and leading to poor service delivery.

While it is plausible that insecurity may be the most important factor explaining the high poverty levels in the region, it is critical that we do not lose sight of other broader social, political, economic and policy process that may account for the regional inequalities. The time is also right for looking beyond the ravages of war to a phase of rehabilitation and reconstruction of affected areas and people in northern Uganda.

To inform key policy decisions on post-conflict reconstruction of northern Uganda, this paper presents a balanced discussions of the before and after scenario that compares outcomes in this region to elsewhere in the country. Attempts are made to explore in-depth the following broad questions/issues:

1. A comparative analysis of the development outcomes in the North versus the rest of the country. What are the key causes for the regional disparities?
2. Considering selected development initiatives in the North – what has worked and what has not worked? What lessons do we draw from these case studies for future policy action?
3. Steps needed to achieve security and political, social and economic inclusion of the region in the national development process?
4. Identify feasible policy options for post-war reconstruction of Northern Uganda to ensure peace and positive and sustainable development outcomes.

Approach: The Terms of Reference for this paper were discussed at a half-day workshop in October 2002 where stakeholders from both government and non-governmental agencies were highly represented. Follow-up was made of individual and institutional contributions by way of a one-to-one conversation and availing literature. This paper also benefits greatly from existing data and literature. The decision to have the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Office of the President work jointly on the paper has created very useful synergies that crystallize the issues at hand.

Limitation: A statistically valid assessment of the true conditions in the North is precluded by the lack of studies in the Acholi region. The national surveys though they indicate that they cover the entire North, are not conducted in the Acholi region due to security reasons. Due to the intensification of war in this sub-region for more than a decade, it is presumed that most indicators are worse in Acholiland than the rest of North implying an underestimate of the true conditions in the available data.

2. The North: What is Unique?

2.1 Northern Uganda

In this paper, **Northern Uganda** is described as constituting the 13 districts within the regions of Acholi, Lango, West Nile, Madi and Karamoja. These are Kitgum, Gulu and Pader in Acholi, Apac and Lira constituting Lango, Moyo and Adjumani in Madi region, Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripiti in Karamoja and Arua, Yumbe and Nebbi forming the West Nile. These are geographically defined based on the statistical demarcation by the National Bureau of Statistics.

However, recognition is given to the fact that the North is also politically defined as including the 5 districts in the Teso region in addition to the 13 bringing the total to 18 districts. The political definition of the North takes into account all those districts that have suffered under armed conflict despite the fact that they are categorized statistically to be in the Eastern region. The five districts in the Teso region are Soroti, Katakwi, Kumi, Kaberamaido and Pallisa.

The argument here is that all these districts have been equally devastated by armed conflict and are all poverty stricken. By the latest National Household Survey 1999/2000, they all fall under the average national household consumption level (see Annex 1) and deserve similar treatment. In this paper, the analysis will be restricted to the 13 core districts but any affirmative action extended to these districts can also apply to the 5 districts in the Teso region.

2.2 What is poverty in Northern Uganda?

Generally, poverty in Uganda (including the Northern region) is defined¹ as the *'lack of basic necessities and services such as food, clothing, beddings, shelter, basic health care, roads, markets, education, information and communication'*. But there are many other definitions and indicators that help us understand what it means to be poor when you live in the North as illustrated by the these voices:

For a widow in Barungwee, Kitgum *"it is when children have been abducted or killed by rebels and Karamojong rustlers hence left alone with nobody to help"*

Children in Gulu described poverty as *"being born and living in a war affected area"*.

"there is no tomorrow for me so there isn't any need for me to waste my effort working. The rebels may come and destroy everything in a minute so what I do is just to go and drink" man, Bura Central Kitgum.

"Poverty is the constant problem of having no oxen and plough" male youth, Naoi village, Moroto.

2002 Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPAII) Report

¹ Based on the 2001/02 Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPAII).

These definitions bring out the complexity of poverty in the region whereby this goes beyond the lack of basic necessities to issues of insecurity, loss of incentive to work, lack of productive assets and the feeling that one is born in the wrong place.

2.3 What is different about Northern Uganda?

The North has a number of distinct peculiarities or attributes that distinguish it from the rest of the country and which draw attention for policy action. They include the following:

1. *Insecurity*

Large parts of the North have been devastated by armed conflict since the mid 1980s as well as the old age cattle rusting. While the war has long subsided in the Teso region, it is still raging in other parts of the North particularly the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader in Acholi land. Cattle rusting is also having its toll in the Karamoja region and the neighbouring districts. This is happening at a time when the rest of the country is considered to be relatively stable and at peace.

2. *Internal displacement and refugees*

As a result of insecurity, large sections of the populations in the affected districts remain internally displaced in protected camps that lack the barest minimum of basic services, and these people depend mainly on relief aid. The North is also host to large number of refugees from neighbouring countries particularly Sudan and the Republic of Congo that are also facing problems of armed conflict.

As of May 2002, Uganda hosts about 187,683 refugees, 87 percent of whom come from Sudan. Close to 80 percent of all refugees in Uganda live in Northern Uganda particularly in the districts of Adjumani, Moyo, Pader and Arua. Refugees in these settlements continue facing insecurity. For instance in 1996, the LRA massacred 109 refugees in Acholi Pii Refugee Settlement in Kitgum (Directorate of Refugees statistics). Due to further attacks on this camp in 2002, close to 24,000 refugees were resettled from Acholi Pii to a new location in Masindi district.

Uniqueness in Northern Uganda

- Insecurity
- Internal displacement
- Large under-utilized land mass
- High population growth rates
- Highest poverty levels
- HIV/AIDS threat
- Pastoralism
- Modest diversification and low asset base
- Historical marginalization

3. *Large but under-utilized land mass*

Geographically, this is the largest region covering 35% of the total land surface in Uganda followed by central (25%), western (23%) and eastern (16%). However, it is the least populated region with an estimated population of 5.4m in 2002, lower than the other regions. This and many other factors have led to large tracts of land remaining unused or under-utilized compared to other parts of the country where land pressure is escalating resulting into land fragmentation and land conflicts. This land offers enormous potential for economic development.

4. *High population growth rates*

Despite the low population numbers, the North is threatened by high and unprecedented population growth rates that supersede what is happening in other parts of the country. Preliminary results from the census indicate that the average population growth rate for the North stands at 4.6 percent per annum far above the 2.7 percent (Central), 3.5 percent (Eastern) and 2.9 percent per annum in the Western region. Such high growth rates are potentially damaging to the development process and are a catalyst for increased household poverty.

5. *Highest levels of poverty*

Income poverty declined rapidly nationally between 1992 and 2000 from 56% to 35%. However, poverty levels have not fallen at the same pace regionally but rather have remained high in Northern Uganda. The proportion of people in the region unable to meet their basic consumption needs declined marginally from 72% in 1992/93 to 66% in 1999/00, although the urban dwellers experienced a much faster poverty decline from 55% to 31% within the same period. Between 1997 and 2000, poverty rose from 60 to 66% implying 2 out of 3 persons are poor in the region. Almost a half (44.3%) of the poorest 20% in Uganda live in Northern Uganda.

6. *HIV/AIDS Threat*

Recent evidence² shows that, in the conflict situation, sex has become a commodity particularly in the most disturbed parts of the North, with soldiers being the main buyers since they are considered to be better off than the average person. Rape is not uncommon especially when women and girls are abducted and this has increased chances of spread of HIV/AIDS and STDs. Where levels of education are low, in part a consequence of the conflict, efforts to communicate to the population about the risks of contracting AIDS and ways of reducing such risks are rendered ineffective. Population movement and displacement continues to fuel the spread of the AIDS scourge.

7. *Semi-arid conditions and pastoralism in Karamoja*

Parts of the Karamoja region is characterized by semi-arid conditions with low and erratic rainfall ranging between 500-1000mm. Uncertainty of rainfall means that the majority of the people in this region cannot depend solely on cultivation. They combine mobile livestock keeping with seasonal cultivation. The Karimojong are thus unique in that they are the only group of people in Uganda who live a semi-nomadic life. It is also striking that Karamoja is the one area that combines pastoralism and a large concentration of cattle when other neighbouring districts in Teso have suffered destocking.

8. *Modest diversification and low asset base*

The majority of households in the North (77%)³ depend on subsistence agriculture in the rural areas with very modest diversification into manufacturing and trade during the past decade. For example, the number of household heads in Northern Uganda that are engaged in the

² CSOPNU

³ 1999/2000 UNHS

manufacturing and trade sectors increased modestly from 3% in 1992 to 7% in 1999, much slower than the other regions with the central having the largest diversification, although it also showed a decline from 26% in 1992 to 20% in 1999⁴.

9. Human rights challenges

Relating to the rebellion itself and its consequences; breakdown of formal dispute resolution mechanisms including the local council courts particularly in Pader and Kitgum; and the militarization of areas where police cannot function, with the army taking over their duties.

10. Specially vulnerable groups

Conflict in the north has made certain groups within society particularly vulnerable in a way that is not reflected in other parts of the country. Such groups include the numerous abducted children, internally displaced persons, people with disabilities due to landmines and torture, orphans whose parents have been killed by rebels, female headed households and the elderly without support in conflict situations.

11. Historical marginalization

Historically (as early as 1890s), the North was used as a labour reservoir for the cash economy Southern parts of Uganda that were considered to have more fertile soils and organized farming. This resulted in the late introduction of cash crop farming in the North, particularly tobacco and cotton, when other parts of the country were far advanced especially in the area of trade. The relatively well-developed infrastructure and tax system in the South compared to Northern Uganda laid foundation for faster development in the former⁵. It took long for inter and intra-regional trade to take root in the North “... by the mid-1950s, farmers in Buganda had cash incomes higher than anywhere else in the country – three times those of farmers in Acholi and West Nile, and nine times higher than the cattle herders of Karamoja. It is an imbalance that the subsequent growth in commerce, public administration and services has only exacerbated.....” Ian Leggett, 2001.

Also refer to Box 1 for insights into the factors contributing to the marginalisation of Karamoja in particular.

⁴ Deininger and Okidi, 2002).

⁵ Mamdani, 2001.

Box 1: The Growth in Pastoral Poverty in Karamoja

Reduced mobility

A key state objective has been to limit mobility of pastoralists in Karamoja. A mobile lifestyle has been equated with backwardness and a threat to state security. County, district and international boundaries have had the effect of restricting mobile resource utilisation, the optimal pastoral response to unpredictable rainfall. Development of new water sources has repeatedly been linked with this objective of reducing mobility and encouraging settlement. Water is frequently perceived as the simple technocratic solution : water will develop the people because they do not have enough for their livestock. It will stop people having to move to other districts to look for it. Part of the rationale for the construction of dams and valley tanks by the colonial government was that it would limiting the need for herders to cross the Karamoja boundaries. This view remains largely in tact. In 1995, the President gave a directive that the 'Karimojong' should remain within their district boundaries and the emergency rehabilitation of valley dams was planned to facilitate this (Watson, 1997: 11).

Unplanned water impacting on seasonal grazing patterns

In fact, pastoralists move in response to a range of factors, the most fundamental, along with water, being availability of grazing. Provision of new water points does not obviate the need for mobility in arid environments to exploit the unpredictable distribution of grazing resources. At the same time, the introduction of new water sources in pastoral areas can have negative effects on rangeland. Water development during the colonial period apparently led to over-concentration and overgrazing of livestock in certain areas. An FAO team after independence advised a halt in construction of dams and tanks until a review was carried out. This was not done and dam construction continued (Mamdani et al, 1992: 52). Seasonal grazing patterns in Karamoja involve leaving some areas ungrazed during the wet season so they can recover and provide grazing during the dry season. The siting of new water points which fails to take account of such customary practices can undermine existing grazing patterns and result in permanent grazing throughout the year. It would appear that most new livestock water points introduced since the colonial period have not been based on an understanding of grazing patterns or planned in consultation with customary authorities.

Increase in areas of cultivation in rangeland

Promotion of sedentary, mainly agricultural, livelihoods has been the de facto aim of most state and non state interventions. There has been an expansion of agriculture in the more fertile areas, such as Karenga in Dodoth, Namalu in Pian, and Iriir in Bokora, which were previously dry season grazing areas. Already by the 1960s, land under cultivation had increased up to five times in some areas since the introduction of the ox-plough (Dyson Hudson, 1996: 43). This has clearly involved benefits to some households in terms of increased agricultural production. However, increase in agriculture, has meant reduction in grazing land. A challenge lies in finding an effective balance between these two land uses. This has been elusive to date given the pre-occupation of state and development agencies with agriculture to the exclusion of pastoralism.

Gazetting of wildlife and forest reserves

36% of the total land area in Karamoja is currently gazetted as protected areas for a national park and wildlife and forest reserves. Grazing, settlement and cultivation is prohibited in these areas, although these restrictions are not currently enforced in all areas. This is discussed further in section 3.3.

Shrinking rangeland under increased grazing pressure

The effect of the above has been a reduction in the grazing areas available to pastoralists and increased livestock pressure on the remaining areas of grazing. Mamdani et al (1992) conclude that the twentieth century saw a dramatic change in the vegetation ecology of Karamoja with a deterioration in the status of grazing land.

Inappropriate and inadequate access to services

Service delivery in Karamoja is the weakest in Uganda and often inappropriate to pastoral livelihoods. Notable are the poor and declining provision of veterinary services and lowest primary school enrolment in the country.

Lack of alternatives to pastoral livelihoods

Reducing per capita herds make imperative the development of alternative livelihoods to pastoralism. But the poor state of basic infrastructure and isolation of Karamoja have contributed to the lack of such alternatives.

Source: DFID, 2002: Anti-pastoralism and the growth of poverty and insecurity in Karamoja

3. Conflict and the peace making process

In this section, the chronology of events that have perpetuated insurgency and insecurity in the North over the years are discussed. Some of the key questions being answered are: Why has insecurity persisted despite efforts to improve the situation? Which forces have played a significant part in this process? In subsequent sections, the development outcomes and economic implications of insecurity are discussed.

3.1 Insurgency in the north

Northern Uganda has since the mid-1880s experienced violent conflicts and insurgency that have occurred as a result of rebel activity particularly in the Acholi and West regions and cattle rustling in the Karamoja region. Conflict has been fuelled by a combination of factors including resistance to the current government, support from external forces, the proliferation of guns in the region, poverty, imbalances to access in economic opportunities and in Karamoja, the need to accumulate wealth. The rebel insurgency may be collapsed into five principle phases as shown in the timeline in the Box 2 below. This does not include cattle rustling in Karamoja.

Box 2: Time line for rebel insurgency in Northern Uganda

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Main fighting body</u>	<u>Period</u>
Phase I	Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA)	March 1986/July 1988
Phase II	Holy Spirit Movement (HSM)	Late 1986/End 1987
Phase III	UPDA and Severino Likoya	Jan 1988 - Aug 1989
Phase IV	Uganda People's Democratic Christians Army (Joseph Kony), UNRFII	Late 1888 – Feb 1994
Phase V	Lords Resistance Army (LRA)	March 1994 – present

Source: Compiled from Office of the President information; Gersony, 1997

Phase I: UPDA in the Acholi Region

Most of the former Acholi Uganda's National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers who retreated from Kampala, when the National Resistance Army (NRA) came into power in 1986, continued North and finally crossed into Sudan where they got refuge and a base for re-organization. In August 1986, the Acholi exiled soldiers in Southern Sudan organized themselves into a fighting force, the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) and

launched an attack on NRA forces based at Bibia to the northern of Gulu Town. By late 1986, the UPDA arms had dwindled and they were less active. Alice Lakwena, an Acholi woman, used this slump in activity to her advantage to revitalize the Acholi resistance movement.

Phase II: Enter Lakwena of Holy Spirit Movement

In late 1986, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), headed by an Acholi Woman Alice “Lakwena”, seized the opportunity of the UPDA’s demoralization forcefully captured some of the UPDA soldiers to fight in her ranks. The HSM philosophy was based on belief in the power of spirits and included a conviction that the Acholi should embrace the objective of regaining power in Kampala. The Lakwena movement promised liberation to the Acholi who felt they were being punished for atrocities committed by the Acholi soldiers fighting the NRA under Obote II and General Tito Okello Lutwa. The HSM actually pushed the battle from the Acholi land through Lango, Teso and were eventually defeated in October 1987 at Magamaga some 90kms east of Kampala.

Phase III: The UPDA Chapter and Severino Likoya Kiberu

The remnants of UPDA continued their struggle as a separate movement until in 1988 when, they recognized the hopelessness of the insurgency, abandoned armed struggle under the first amnesty by Government and signed a peace accord with the government. Meanwhile those who had little education and had committed atrocities and had little chance of getting significant gain remained in the bush to continued fighting.

Meanwhile, Alice Lakwena’s father, Severino Likoya Kiberu who called himself “God the Father”, continued the struggle started by her daughter. Many of his followers were killed in Kitgum, after which some of the survivors defected to Joseph Kony’s group which was being mobilized at this time to resist Government. Angry with the Acholi public for its lack of support, Severino’s group engaged in violent killings of civilians who refused to join him. This insurgency did not last long as Severino was captured and later released (Gersony, 1997).

Phase IV: Enter Joseph Kony and UNRFII

- ***Lord’s Resistance Army (late 1987-Feb 1994)***

By the time UPDA signed the peace accord in 1988, one angry Acholi named Joseph Kony had already broken away in 1985 from the group and formed his own group first known as the Lord’s Salvation Army, then the United People’s Democratic Christians Army (UPDCA), and in 1992 renamed the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This group is reported to be guided by spirits like the HSM. Between late 1987 and February 1994, the LRA pursued war but at a low intensity. The Government undertook a number of operations to end this insurgency in its initial phase including mobilization of civilian population to form defense units. Lack of technical competence in the armed forces to deal with insurgency is said to have prevented complete victory. In 1994, the government held talks with LRA but these fell through and marked the beginning of mass abduction of children, which intensified during the following year 1995.

- ***Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) in West Nile***

The Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) High Command then operating from West Nile, willingly accepted to join NRM/A leading to the 1986 peace talks that sealed their relationship. A battalion of UNRF soldiers was absorbed in the NRA and the rest were encamped at Bombo Army Barracks waiting for integration into NRM/A and or resettlement in their homes.

- ***Enter UNRFII***

The officers and men of UNRF who felt they were left out and were not happy with this arrangement claimed that they formed the UNRFII. The UNRF II forces were based in Southern Sudan and enjoyed hospitality of the Sudanese government. Since 1998 the UNRF II made overtures of wanting to talk peace with government but often made outrageous demands that could not be met by government. On 15th June 2002, then Government of Uganda signed a historic ceasefire agreement with UNRF II leadership inside Uganda. Most of their fighters had returned and were encamped in Yumbe district of West Nile.

Phase V: Lords Resistance Army (March 1994-present)

Although a continuation of the insurgency by LRA since 1987, the March 1994 to present is the period during which for the first time the LRA received military assistance from the Sudan Government and hence changed tactics focusing on abduction since military ware was no longer a constraint (Gersony, 1997).

During the election of 1996, the LRA announced that they would lay down their weapons and give up the rebellion if the Democratic Party (DP) opposition leader were to become Uganda's President. The DP lost and so LRA resumed their acts of insurgency. In January 1997 Uganda's Parliament voted to allow the government to pursue military means to end the conflict. In retaliation the LRA committed the worst atrocities on the population amongst the Acholi's and have continued to do so up to present.

The Karamoja Region

The Karamoja region, has for several decades suffered from problems of internal conflict fuelled by the proliferation of guns in the region. Gun trade has for long been well established even in the most remote parts of Karamoja. The economy in this region thrives on cattle raiding, which is part and parcel of the pastoral production system. Cattle raiding which involves armed theft of cattle among the different pastoral clans, has tended to cause heavy losses of lives and property not only inside Karamoja but also the neighbouring districts. Also refer to MFPED Discussion Paper 5 for further details.

By the year 2000 when the government first announced plans to disarm the Karamojong, more than three million Ugandans in the districts of Kitgum, Lira, Soroti, Kumi, Mbale and Kapchorwa had lost the bulk of their cattle through the Karamojong terror. The presence of illicit guns in hands of Karamojong warriors also continued to affect the government efforts to restock in the affected districts.

3.2 Consequences of insecurity

Several parts of this report do highlight some of the difficulties faced by people in the North as a result of insecurity. The next section (4) dwells substantively on development outcomes in the region that are strongly influenced by the lack of peace in the past years. This section restricts itself to some of the immediate consequences of insecurity that must also be re-addressed in order to uplift the lives of people in the north as well as the country as a whole.

3.2.1 Economic Implications of Insecurity for the Country and Region

It has been established as a fact that war in the North is the most important factor explaining low development in the North. Evidence also seems to indicate that, not only the North is affected but the war is a significant factor reducing the pace of development of Uganda as a whole. Generic international research suggests that during a civil war, the rate of growth of GDP per capita is typically reduced by 2.2% per annum⁶. An attempt has been made by a consortium of 25 NGOs in Uganda within the ambits of the Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU) to bring this analysis closer home by quantifying the cost of the Northern war (focusing on Acholiland) to the country in general and the affected region in particular. The conflict in the North is continuing to cost the economy in a number of ways – the principle costs are given in Box 3.

Box 3: Principle costs of Northern Conflict

- Direct military expenditure
- Loss of lives, physical assets, food
- Internal displacement and loss of will to produce
- Disruption of social service delivery
- Poor maintenance of economic infrastructure
- Higher cost of transport resulting in exaggerated prices of basic needs such as kerosene.
- Health care costs have increased – HIV/AIDS on the rise, poor living conditions, poor nutrition, injuries and mutilation
- Loss of tax revenue and foreign exchange from foregone sales of cash crops and tourism
- Low productivity – poorly educated and paid labour force, reduced cultivation, poor technologies
- Considerable outmigration
- Environmental degradation and mismanagement
- Disruption of cross border trade
- Loss of investment and investment opportunities
- Negative effects on neighbouring districts/regions – spill over costs

The conflict has resulted in loss of lives and serious injuries that limit people's participation in production. For example, it is estimated that there are approximately 6000 amputees in the Northern region who are being attended to by the Orthopedic Workshop of Gulu Hospital. Most of these need urgent assistance, as they cannot afford the US\$120 for replacing the lost limbs with substitutes. While direct expenditure on military may be necessary to end the war, it is recognized as a major cost to the national economy. Funds that would have further improved the delivery of goods and basic services in the economy are instead spent on the war resulting in a lower quality of life for the whole country.

⁶ Larkin, 2000: Day of Analysis on Northern Uganda.

Taking all the above costs and many more into account, the total cost of the war in Acholiland to the nation has been estimated conservatively at about US\$1.3 billion over the period of conflict. On average, this represents a loss of over 3 percent of GDP annually. The specific economic impacts of insecurity are as follows:

3.2.2 Internally Displaced People (IDP) and Refugees

A quick assessment of the IDP camps in Gulu conducted by UNICEF in March 2001 revealed:

- A high incidence of children under five in the classrooms, implying that older children had to bring them to school since parents were busy working in the fields.
- The classrooms in primary one to four had an average number of 160 Pupil obviously over crowded.
- The dropout rate was high in P.5 to P.7.
- School attendance was irregular due to home chores like food collection and etc.
- Regular movement forwards and backwards to areas of origin when threats to security subsided.
- Schools hosting displaced children were highly congested

The conflict has left many children unaccompanied as orphans. It has generally disrupted the education of the of the children and adolescents and threatens their physical well-being and psychological development.

3.2.3 Food Insecurity

The districts of Kitgum and Gulu have some 20% of Uganda's arable land. This land is excluded from production because of the conflict. The infrastructure in the area such as roads, trading centers and marketing societies have been destroyed or deteriorated to a point where marketing of any would be surplus commodities is impossible.

The Acholi are unable to contribute to the country's revenue base and development. The displacement has effectively prevented them from being gaining employed. They are made involuntary dependents on aid flows. This displacement has also discouraged internal and external investment. The negative aggregate effects on output, food production, investment and exports are a threat to future viability of the region.

3.3 Conflict resolution and the peace making processes

The Government of Uganda places utmost importance on guaranteeing peace to all Ugandans to enable them participate in development so as to improve their welfare and that of the nation as a whole. It is in this spirit that numerous initiatives have been undertaken geared towards ending armed conflict and attaining peace in the North as well as other parts of the country that are equally affected. This is being achieved through a combination of methods including military operations and campaigns, peace talks with rebel groups, community mobilization, political education, disarmament and amnesty. A summary of these is presented in the Box 4 below and a discussion of the some of these efforts follows.

3.3.1 Amnesty

Following persistent calls by the most affected communities in the North for a peaceful approach to the resolution of armed conflict in the country, the Government in 2000 declared an amnesty in respect of all persons who had been engaged in acts of rebellion. This was through enactment of the Amnesty Act 2000⁷.

The amnesty provides assurances and incentives for those wishing to abandon rebellion to do so without fear of retribution or revenge.

Implementation is by the Amnesty Commission that also includes the Demobilization and Resettlement Team (DRT) officers operating at regional level, working closely with the UPDF, Police, Director of Public Prosecution, NGOs and donor agencies. Commendable progress has been made in realizing benefits from the Amnesty Act but many challenges also have to be overcome as identified by Amnesty Commission⁸ (See Box 5).

Box 4: Efforts at Peace making and reconciliation

- Peace pact with UPDA in June 1988
- July 1990 Addis Ababa peace accord with UPDM
- Peace negotiations with LRA
- Establishment of County Security Committees in 1989
- The Acholi Pacification Committee (APC) in 1994
- Establishment of protected villages
- Blanket Amnesty
- Facilitation the return of political exiles
- Repatriation of refugees and abducted children
- Reintegration of former combatants into the UPDF
- Disarmament
- Improving diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries
- Civil society involvement

3.3.2 Diplomacy and peace negotiations

Uganda has continued to pursue diplomacy to restore good relations with the countries that have been harbouring, abetting or assisting the rebels. These include the Governments of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo where diplomatic missions have been reopened. The Government of Uganda has also continued to participate in the Lusaka Peace Accord initiative under the auspices of the international community.

The Amnesty Commission, Government, NGOs, religious leaders and community members have promoted reconciliation and dialogue among various rebel groups with success. Examples include the talks with various LRA commanders and the mediation of peace talks by the Amnesty Commission between Government and the UNRFII that led to the signing of the peace agreement between the two parties on 24th December 2002.

⁷ Amnesty is a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal or any other form of punishment by the state. A person seeking to be granted amnesty is referred to as a reporter.

⁸ Amnesty Commission, 2003. Implementation of the Amnesty Act 2000: Achievements, Challenges and Future Plans, Kampala.

Box 5: Implementation of the Amnesty Act 2000: Progress and Challenges

Purpose: To ensure peace and security for all Ugandans by adopting a policy of reconciliation aimed at pacifying insurgent groups.

Priority Actions

- i) Promoting the Amnesty Act 2000
- ii) Carrying out demobilization and disarmament of reporters
- iii) Granting amnesty to reporters and thereafter reintegrate and resettle them in their communities
- vi) Building capacity in the Amnesty Commission to oversee the implementation of the Act.

Main progress areas

- i) **Amnesty promotion:** increased awareness about the Amnesty Law both in Uganda and Sudan. The Amnesty Act has been translated in 7 local languages and is broadcast through various communication channels;
- ii) **Promoting Dialogue:** some degree of success has been attained in promoting reconciliation and dialogue among various rebel groups particularly the LRA and UNRFII. A peace agreement was signed between Government and UNRFII on 24th Dec 2002.
- iii) **Receiving and granting Amnesty to Reporters:** Up to date, nearly 7,275 reporters have responded positively to the amnesty law. Of these, the largest group was from the UNRF II fighting group (37.9 percent), followed by the West Nile Bank Front (27.4 percent), LRA (26.7 percent) and other groups (8 percent).
- iv) **Disarmament and decommissioning weapons:** 2500 UNRF II reporters who have been given Amnesty in Yumbe district surrendered a large consignment of weapons to the UPDF which are being put together with those received from reporters in other areas. The Amnesty Commission and the army arrange for appropriate methods of decommissioning the arms.
- v) **Reception Centers:** have been established by CSOs and the Commission in the districts of Gulu, Arua, Kitgum, Mbale, Pader, Kampala and Kasese. These promote improved psychosocial support and health care for reporters; counseling at the district, community, household and individual level; rehabilitation of reporters and provision of vocational skills and resettlement assistance. About 63.9 percent of the reporters have been received by the Arua Reception Centre.
- vi) **Demobilization, reintegration and resettlement:** resettlement assistance and social support has been provided to reporters by the Commission, NGOs, traditional leaders, religious groups and the community; 907 reporters have been resettled. 2500 reporters and the former UNRF II combatants are being resettled and re-integrated under the Yumbe UNRF II Special Project and 700 ex-LRA reporters are being resettled under a Danish Supported Project.
- vii) **Children resettlement:** 130 children who were in UNRF II ranks were released, have been counseled and reintegrated into the community.

Key Challenges

- Inadequate funding and facilitation for implementing the priority actions for amnesty, particularly resettlement of reporters and sensitization and counseling. More than 3,500 reporters have not yet been settled.
- The national framework for coordination and implementation of amnesty is not yet fully functional.
- Potential reporters such as LRA fighters do not have easy access to information on the amnesty.
- The government needs to increasingly allocate more funds to the amnesty process.

Source: Amnesty Commission, 2003.

There are also on-going peace negotiations with Kony's Lord's Resistance Army Rebels, which commenced in July 2002. Indications are that progress is being made and the religious and political leaders are spearheading these efforts. Most prominent among these is the Acholi Religious Peace Initiative, which has been bridging the dialogue between Government and the rebels. Government has agreed to a cease-fire on condition that rebels cease kidnapping and attacking civilians and damaging of property. The main challenge is that the rebels are yet to respond to the conditions of the ceasefire. These developments demonstrate a positive trend in Government's efforts to quell the rebellion in the North.

3.3.3 Disarmament

The presence of small arms has aggravated inter-ethnic conflicts and cattle raids within Karamoja and the neighbouring districts. Cattle rustling and possession of guns by the Karimojong is a key concern to Government and people in the region as this has been identified as a key cause of death and poverty⁹. In December 2001, Government embarked on implementing a disarmament programme aimed at restoring peace in Karamoja after a period of intensive raids that had become increasingly destructive in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The key intentions of the programme included enlisting support for peaceful disarmament of people at grassroots level, ending armed conflict by the Karimojong warriors and protecting the citizenry, stopping illegal gun trafficking and working closely with Kenya and Sudan to ensure concurrent disarmament of the Turkana and Didinga. Those who surrendered their guns would be resettled and rehabilitated.

The disarmament process was undertaken in two phases. Phase one conducted during December 2001 entailed the voluntary surrender of weapons by the warriors, and phase two implemented immediately thereafter involved forced disarmament by the UPDF. Phase one registered the highest level of compliance with a total of 6,593 guns (Table 1) being surrendered voluntarily following a UHRC-led sensitisation campaign which helped to allay some of the warriors' fears about the entire exercise. The collections in phase one represent close to 70 percent of the total number of guns (9763) collected in the two phases by 20th September 2002 implying that voluntary surrender is a more effective approach to ridding the area of illegal guns. Greater effort therefore should be focused on helping those in possession of guns to appreciate the need to surrender their guns (MFPED, 2003).

Table 1: Weapons collected between 2 December 2001 and 17 January 2002

District	County	As at 2 December 2001	As at 12 December 2001	As at 14 January 2002	As at 17 January 2002
Moroto	Bokora	1059	1163	1536	1560
	Matheniko	500	554	669	671
Nakapipirit	Chekwi	270	336	509	509
	Pian	0	409	575	582
	Pokot	101	106	348	352
Kotido	Dodoth	438	513	1252	1293
	Jie	360	623	1198	1240
	Labowor	100	319	358	386
Sub-Totals		2828	4023	6445	6593

Source: UHRC (2003) Annual Report 2001-2002

⁹ UPPAP, 2000. Learning from the Poor.

Government also extended the disarmament exercise to the Sabiny in Kapchorwa who keep guns for their own protection. A total of 763 guns had been collected from people in Kapchorwa as of 20th September 2002. The process of disarmament still continues.

Civil Military Operation Centres (CMOCs) in the three districts of Karamu, formally linking the army and civil society. The CMOCs provide accountability for guns collected from sub-counties and their main function is to coordinate with the district teams of civil society, local government and traditional leaders; act as harmonious points for civilians and UPDF forces; receive complaints against the military and take remedial actions and assist in any displacement due to the disarmament. These are conveniently located so that ordinary Karimojong civilians can access them without fear.

The 2003 PSR notes that although a lot of efforts have gone into the disarmament process, it has been influenced by different interpretations of its intentions especially by community members. The PPA2 study reports that in some cases the community members saw the process of disarmament as one that created conditions of vulnerability especially for those who had to surrender their guns before the neighbouring communities surrendered their guns¹⁰. It is therefore necessary that these fears are allayed if the process is going to be effective. The Karimojong bitterly complained about the indiscriminate impounding of their animals, to which the President issued a directive in April 2002, for it to be stopped. Other studies have called for the establishment of a long-term disarmament exercise with the active control of local leaders in the process¹¹.

Other additional factors hampering the disarmament exercise and efforts to stop cattle raiding include:

- a) The continued cross-boarder raids against the Karimojong by warriors in bordering areas of Kenya.
- b) The lack of enforcement of law and order in Karamu makes it difficult to ensure the timely arrest and prosecution of criminal offenders.
- c) The local's interpretation of UPDF temporal ban of wearing a *suka* to conceal a gun to mean an order banning the Karimojongs from dressing in their traditional wear (MFPED, 2003).
- d) Continued supply of small arms from Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.
- e) Need to strengthen the UPDF and local defence units to deal with insecurity in Karamu.

3.3.4 Civil Society Involvement

In addition to what has already been mentioned above, many other initiatives have been undertaken by government in collaboration with various NGOs to contribute to reconciliation and the peace making process. For example, in Karamoja, the Karamoja Initiative for sustainable peace association (KISP) has been working with various NGOs in the region to promote reconciliation. The project implementation Unit of KISP focuses reconciliation and efforts to address the problems of water, livestock services, micro-finance, peace lectures,

¹⁰ MFPED/UPPAP (2002): Moroto Report

¹¹ See University of Leeds (2001) *Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD Sub Region: Phase 2: Implementation* written by Frank Muhereza; Conflict, Disaster and Development Group, University of Leeds, Leeds

classrooms, etc. The Initiative has involved Karamojong elders to promote peace based on the Kaeramojong family structure.

The Pokot: Karamoja Turkana and Sabiny (POKATUSA) NGO in the last few years has enabled the Karimojong to reach agreements with their neighbours to deal with criminals who cause insecurity in the region. Other NGOs such as the Lutheran World Federation and the Acholi-jie peace Dialogue and Reconciliation initiated by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLP) have played a key role in facilitating mediation efforts between warring functions in Karamoja and the neighbouring districts of Kitgum and Pader.

In the West Nile Region, the first peace initiative was led by an organisation known as Aringa, Obong Peace Committee (AROPIC) arising from the fact that Aringa area was the hub of rebel activity in the West Nile Region (Abidi, 2002). Commendable work has also been done by several other CSOs in the area of peace building, including the following (this list is not exhaustive but only indicative):

- a) Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)
- b) Gulu Support the Children organization (GUSCO)
- c) 'Ka In Kono' Women's Association (KIKWA) in Acholi
- d) UWESO, Gulu Branch
- e) Gulu District Reconciliation Peace Team
- f) Church of Uganda
- g) World Vision International
- h) Centre for Conflict resolution
- i) People's Voice for Peace
- j) Human Rights Focus (HRF), Gulu
- k) Justice and Peace Commission Joint Forum for Peace (JFP) in Pader and Kitgum

3.3.5 Military operations

In addition to the diplomatic measures, Government has also engaged in military campaigns and operations to deter and subdue the rebel forces in the North and in the Western part of the country. Excessive military pressure exerted on the main rebel group in Northern Uganda, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) has been a result of a protocol signed on 10th March 2002 between the Governments of Uganda and Sudan. This protocol allowed Uganda to mount limited operations into southern Sudan to destroy the LRA bases and rescue the children that are being held captive. This was done through the anti-LRA campaign known as '*Operation Iron Fist*' that commenced on 15th March 2002.

This initiative is regarded as being largely successful as it rid civilian areas of rebel infestations. It dislodged the LRA rebel leader and his forces from Southern Sudan and led to the capture of a large number of guns and ammunition. UPDF forces were able to rescue 6,000 people who were reportedly being held in LRA camps. However a negative consequence of the Operation was that having lost refuge in southern Sudan, the rebels crossed back into Uganda causing terror and great suffering of the people of Acholiland. Between June and September 2002, more lives and property were lost than in the whole of 2001. Close to 1000 people including civilians, UPDF soldiers and the rebels lost their lives. Though not exact, Table 2 gives rough indications of the toll of the conflict on the population during 2001-2002 (UHRC, 2003).

Table 2: Impact of rebel activities on the population in 2001 and 2002

	UPDF Dead	Rebels dead	Civilians Killed	Civilians rescued/released	Civilians injured	Civilians abducted
2001	40	60	98	264	125	52
2002	171	436	670	737	172	1775

Source: UHRC 2001-2002 Annual Report

The continued loss of lives and property in the past decade and the marked rise in the number of victims in the recent past is of great concern to the Government and presents a major challenge for future growth and development of this region. In recognition of this, the Government is rallying all resources at its disposal to bring this rebellion to an end. To ensure that correct measures are implemented speedily to end the war with minimum casualties, the President has found it necessary to camp in Gulu to foresee the Operation. This in a way sends a signal regarding the importance Government attaches to ending the insurgency in the North.

4. Development Outcomes in Northern Uganda

In this section, a comparative analysis of the state of service delivery and development outcomes in the country and inter-regionally is made. In particular, the analysis focuses on delivery of education, health, water and sanitation, population control and advisory services. Welfare or outcome indicators such as housing, infant mortality, nutrition, literacy and disease incidence are also discussed.

4.1 Status and quality of service delivery

4.1.1 Education

Here two key indicators of performance in service provision within the education sector are tracked: the Pupil-Teacher Ratio and Pupil-Classroom Ratio. At the national level, commendable progress has been made towards the Education Sector Investment Plan (ESIP) targets. Refer to Annex 3. Within the period FY 2002/03 – 2004/05, the education sector is expected to meet the following targets¹²:

- a) Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR) of 44:1 (short of the desired target of 40:1)
- b) Pupil Classroom Ratio (PCR) of 84:1 (also short of the desired target of 40:1)

The majority of districts in the country have attained or are moving steadily towards achieving the six monthly review targets which will ultimately lead to the expected outcomes. It should be noted that although some districts in Northern Uganda have been able to move along with the national trend, the majority are grossly lagging behind in both of the selected indicators. However, even some districts in the east particularly Pallisa and Tororo, are also not doing any better.

Service provision in the education sector seems to be worse off in the new districts of Yumbe, Pader and Nakapiripiti which have much higher pupil-teacher and pupil-classroom

¹² Aide Memoire of Eighth Education Sector Review October 2002.

ratios. This seems to be a general problem of new districts since Kyenjojo, Mayuge, Kayunga also have high ratios.

4.1.2 Water and Sanitation Status

a) Water coverage

At the national level, by June 2002, about 55 percent of the rural population was estimated to have access to safe water, having improved from 49.6 percent in 2000 and 18.4 percent in 1991. The major challenge remains that some 30 percent of constructed water facilities are not functioning properly. The Ugandan Urban Water Sector covers approximately 78 towns (total population 2.95million) of which 33 have populations greater than 15,000 hence referred to as large urban centers and they account for about 80 percent of the total urban population. An estimated 60 percent of the population in the large urban centers have access to safe water sources, an improvement from the 50 percent level in 1998/99.

The water and sanitation conditions in the North have improved significantly over the last decade although the focus has been more tilted to installation than functionality. Similar to the national trend, many of the protected water sources in this region are non-functional due to defective designs, poor construction supervision at the district level and lack of operational and maintenance funds.

Most districts in the North have a more than average water coverage with Moyo, Nebbi and Adjumani doing much better (Table 3). The challenge remains to raise water coverage in the districts of Apac, Kitgum and Pader to reduce on households' reliance on unsafe water sources. The lack of protected water sources is singled out as the most important reason why people in Northern Uganda resort to unsafe water.

Table 3: Rural safe water coverage in Northern Uganda and other districts during 2000-2002 (%)

District	Water Coverage in 2000	Water Coverage in 2002
Northern districts		
Adjumani	58.9	66.3
Apac	43.7	47.0
Arua/Yumbe	55.7	57.0
Gulu	47.5	51.1
Kitgum/Pader	40.5	43.3
Kotido	58.0	61.6
Lira	50.3	52.8
Moroto/Nakapiripirit	30.1	63.0
Moyo	86.6	74.2
Nebbi	69.1	73.6
Other districts		
Jinja	47.1	48.2
Kamuli	44.3	44.2
Kumi	26.8	37.5

Katakwi	35.9	38.6
Pallisa	25.5	30.6
Tororo	45.8	46.2
Kisoro	31.7	36.4
Masaka	29.6	34.4
Kalangala	36.4	44.2
Mubende	30.5	35.1
Sembabule	18.8	25.2
National average	49.9	54.8

Source: DWD; Water Sector Review, Sept 2002.

Findings from the Infant Mortality study (2002) show that households without access to safe water experience infant mortality that is double that of households with safe water and this might partly explain why health conditions continue to be poor in Northern Uganda. But it should be pointed out that, apart from the 3 districts in the North that have relatively lower water coverage, it is the eastern and parts of the central and western regions that are worse off in water provision.

b) Sanitation and hygiene

On the sanitation side, national household latrine coverage is low and inappropriate estimated at 48 percent. However, there is wide variation of coverage between districts, with a low of 4 percent in Karamoja and over 80 percent in districts in the southwestern part of the country. Latrine coverage in fishing villages is estimated at 10%. Coverage of public latrines is also very low (19 percent), with most of these latrines located in schools, markets and health units. Piped sewerage services are accessible to only about 5 percent of the population in the large urban centers. As with water supply, the number of constructed facilities does not necessarily reflect actual usage by all the intended users due to differing reasons such as cultural taboos and beliefs¹³. It is estimated that 80 percent of the disease burden in Uganda is associated with poor sanitation and hygiene¹⁴.

Sanitation conditions in Northern region are worrying. The 1999/2000 UNHS shows that more than a half of households in the North use an uncovered pit latrine or the bush as a toilet, a finding that was further confirmed by the 2001 NSDS which indicated that 74.4 percent of respondents in the North were affirmative that households in their neighbourhood use the bush or lake as the toilet since they lack one. Table 4 illustrates the type of toilet facilities that are used in two selected districts Apac and Lira. Cultural beliefs and practices were singled out as a key factor in explaining the use of the bush as an alternative.

Table 4: Distribution of Households by Type of Toilet Facility in Lira and Apac Districts in 1999/2000 (%)

District	Flush Toilet	Pit Latrine	Bush	Other
Apac	-	62.0	37.0	1.0
Lira	0.4	80.0	19.3	0.3

Other includes pan, bucket, bush, etc.

Source: 1999/2000 UNHS.

¹³ Rural Water and Sanitation Operation Plan 2002-2007 by MWLE, 2002.

¹⁴ Environmental Health Division, MOH.

The non-availability of proper toilet facilities is worse in rural than urban areas. For example, in Arua district, 24 percent of the population in rural areas had no toilet facilities as compared to 1 percent in urban areas during the 1999/2000 UNHS.

4.1.3 Water for production

Of more relevance to Karamoja is the provision of water for livestock production for a region that falls in the ‘cattle corridor’ where annual rainfall ranges between 500mm to 800mm but varying widely in distribution and reliability. Scarcity of water not only limits livestock production but also encourages nomadism, which in turn leads to the spread of livestock diseases, overgrazing and land degradation, low productivity and conflict.

In the recent past, Government has financed emergency projects to construct valley tanks and dams in dry pastoral areas with mixed results. Interventions have mainly focused on the provision of valley dams in the Karamoja region. The total installed capacity during the period 1999 to 2001 is shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Reservoirs constructed during 1999 - 2001

District	Type	Total capacity installed (cubic metres)	Cattle heads served
Nakapiripirit	3 Valley Tanks, 1 Dam	121,500	22,406
Moroto	3 Dams	261,000	48,332
Kotido	2 Dams	721,000	133,518
Total		1,103,500	204,256

Source: Directorate of Water Development, Status Report on Dams and Valley Tanks, October 16, 2001.

The above sources meet only 15.3 percent of the current livestock water demand (DWD, 2001). The main challenge is that the approach used in providing valley dams has tended to be top-down which is likely to undermine the districts capacity to maintain this infrastructure and may limit acceptability within communities (MFPED, 2003).

There are still many other constraints to overcome. Note that the problems experienced in Karamoja are not unique to this region but common to other semi-arid pastoral areas in the cattle corridor:

- High rate of silting of dams and valley tanks in many parts of the country, including Karamoja has resulted in massive loss of storage capacity. Lack of proper land use and management practices leading to uncontrolled soil erosion, substantially contributes to siltation of surface water reservoirs.
- Absence of credit for small-scale farmers
- Inadequate technical capacity at district level for irrigation
- A weak legal and policy framework. In particular is the lack of a Water for Production Policy and a Strategic Investment Plan.

4.1.4 HIV/AIDS prevalence and control

Despite the remarkable progress made in recent years, the HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to be a major challenge to all Ugandans, irrespective of age, sex, ethnicity or location. The

estimated number of people living with HIV/AIDS in Uganda as of December 2001 is 1,050,555 and the estimated cumulative deaths since the beginning of the epidemic is 947,552 (Surveillance reports). The overall antenatal prevalence rate was estimated at 6.5 percent being slightly higher in urban areas (8.8 percent) than rural areas (4.2 percent)¹⁵. This represents a decline in the overall HIV sero prevalence (total number of cases in a given population during a given period) in recent years from the 10 percent level in 1996 and 8.3 percent in 2000.

Although the HIV infection rates from the major Sentinel Surveillance sites in the country continue to show declining trends (Table 6), some places particularly Lacor Hospital in Gulu continue to record relatively higher rates. A further desegregation of data by district shows a remarkably large number of adults living with AIDS in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Apac, Arua, Moroto and Nebbi among the Northern districts (Annex 2). Neighbouring Soroti in Teso region also exhibits a large number of AIDS victims. Reported clinical AIDS¹⁶ cases are remarkably low in Adjumani, Moyo and Kotido.

Table 6: HIV infection prevalence rates (%) at selected antenatal sentinel sites

Sentinel Site	1995	1997	1999	2001
<i>Northern Uganda</i>				
Arua	-	-	5.2	4.8
Moyo	3.1	-	5.2	2.7
Lacor	14.7	16.3	12.3	11.3
<i>Other regions</i>				
Nsambya	16.8	14.6	12.3	9.5
Mbarara	16.6	14.5	11.3	10.6
Mbale	7.8	6.9	5.7	5.6
Soroti	8.7	5.3	5.0	5.0
Pallisa	-	3.2	3.2	3.7
Kagadi	-	10.3	11.0	7.4

Source: MOH, 2002. HIV Surveillance Report.

No prior analysis has been made to explain these trends but there are indications that the high incidence of HIV/AIDS in some parts of northern Uganda is linked to internal displacement and migration, moral decadence, low awareness about methods of control and poverty.

The declining trends in HIV/AIDS infection rates in most parts of the country are largely associated with positive changes in risky behaviour following increased awareness, the use of condoms and reduction in the practice of re-marrying widows and widowers¹⁷. But the changes in risky behaviour and the level of awareness of HIV/AIDS control measures varies markedly among the regions, with the North being relatively disadvantaged in some cases as shown in Tables 7 and 8.

¹⁵ MOH, 2002.

¹⁶ Clinical AIDS cases refer to those people who turn up voluntarily at sentinel sites to be tested. Figures are just indicative and an underestimate of the reality given that there are many AIDS victims that are never tested.

¹⁷ PSR, 2001.

Table 7: Knowledge of important ways to avoid HIV/AIDS (%)

Region	Knowledge of important ways to avoid HIV/AIDS*						
	None**		One way		Two or more ways		Total
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	
Central	3.5	4.1	1.7	2.8	94.8	93.0	100.0
Eastern	9.0	15.8	7.0	6.7	84.0	77.5	100.0
Northern	5.1	25.5	12.1	20.5	82.8	53.9	100.0
Western	3.6	15.2	3.5	10.1	92.8	74.7	100.0

*Important ways are abstaining from sex, using condoms and limiting number of sexual partners.

**Those who have not heard of AIDS or who do not know of any programmatically important ways to avoid HIV/AIDS

Source: Uganda Demographic Health Survey 2000-2001

Table 8: Knowledge of specific ways to avoid HIV/AIDS (%)

Region	Knowledge of specific ways to avoid HIV/AIDS			
	Use Condoms		Limit number of sexual partners***	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Central	88.8	87.9	93.1	93.0
Eastern	83.2	71.6	85.8	81.2
Northern	72.3	46.4	92.6	72.3
Western	81.6	56.1	92.3	83.6

***Refers to limiting number of sexual partners and limiting sex to one partner/staying faithful to one partner.

Source: Uganda Demographic Health Survey 2000-2001

More than 80 percent of men in all regions and over 70 percent of women in all regions apart from the North have knowledge of two or more important ways to avoid HIV/AIDS. It is the North that remains most disadvantaged in that about a quarter of women in this region have not heard of AIDS and /or do not even know of any important ways to avoid it. They have limited knowledge on condom use which might explain the rise in the epidemic in the region.

While national averages show that 55 percent of women know a source for male condoms, the number is dismal in Northern Uganda. In the 2000/2001 UHDS, only 20.3 percent of women knew a source for the male condoms. It is noted that the level of knowledge increases with the level of education and living in urban areas. Some officials in Uganda have summarized the challenges as follows:

'The North's problems remain enormous even after the guns fall silent. Because alcohol and sex are forms of entertainment and relief for people in war situations, the threat of HIV/AIDS is looming and might wipe more people than the Kony war' Northern Uganda Youth MP.

'The immediate worry is food and shelter. You cannot tell a girl who doesn't know where to spend the night or what to eat about HIV/AIDS. They will simply sleep around. There has been no action to create awareness. Many rural people think AIDS is a disease for the rich and those who stay in towns' Red Cross Official, Gulu.

Monitor Newspaper, Sept 19, 2002


Apparently, HIV/AIDS spreads fastest where poverty and instability prevail indicating that control may require slightly a different approach from that used in non-conflict areas. It is important that Government and other non-government organizations should continue to further current efforts aimed at reducing risky behaviour that pre-exposes people to HIV/AIDS in the country. Special attention should be directed to Northern Uganda to increase awareness about HIV/AIDS particularly among the women and youth. Promoting education and literacy particularly among women and reducing poverty in the region are long-term measures that would ensure sustainable positive change in risky behaviour.

4.2 Welfare indicators

4.2.1 Poverty trends and incidence of chronic poverty


Based on the 1999/2000 household survey, the proportion of the population living below the poverty line in Uganda declined from 56 percent in 1992 to 44 percent in 1997 and eventually 35 percent in 2000 (Appleton, 2001; MFPED, 2001). Poverty in Uganda continues to be geographically concentrated, with the North and East, respectively having the largest proportions of poor people. About 37 percent of the poor Ugandans live in the Northern Region. Another quarter live in the East, while the rest live in the Central and the Western region (Fig 1).

Fig 1: Incidence of poverty in Uganda 1999/2000



Source: 1999/2000 UNHS.

Fig 2: Regional distribution of poverty in Uganda 1999/2000



Source: 1999/2000 UNHS.


In the Northern region, 66 percent of the population is below the poverty line indicating that 2 out of 3 persons are poor. In the Central region, ‘only’ 1 person out of 5 is poor. According to the 2003 PSR, further statistical analysis of the UNHS datasets and decomposition of the poverty statistics (Okidi and Mijumbi, 2001) conclude that at the end of 2000, national poverty was significantly associated with:

- i) Residence in rural areas;
- ii) Residence in Northern region of Uganda; and
- iii) Children (child poverty)

Using data on households interviewed both in 1992 and 1999, Lawson et al (2003)¹⁸ find that there are a core number of households which remain in poverty and a substantial number that moved back into poverty after being non-poor in 1992 (Figure 3).

Disaggregating the poverty movements geographically shows that almost one third (30.1 percent) of the chronically poor¹⁹ are based in the Northern region. Between 1992 and 1999, the proportion of households that moved back into poverty in the Northern region was 20 percent compared to 9 percent in the central region.

Households that are chronically poor or moving back into poverty have high household sizes, less educated household members, low asset base and engaged in subsistence farming.



Improving the asset base of poor people especially in Northern Uganda and promoting their engagement in alternative sources of income particularly in the non-farm sector should be priority on the development agenda. In the medium to long-term, further improvements in the literacy levels will play a key role in dealing with demographic constraints.

4.2.2 Fertility rates


The recent 2000/01 UHDS shows that there are substantial regional differences in fertility rates with the North being worse off at an average of 7.9 births per woman. This is far higher than the national average of 6.9 children per woman, a fertility level that is the second highest in Sub-saharan Africa (after Niger at 7.5 births per woman) and third highest in the world (Niger and Yemen have higher rates. Between 1995 and 2000, fertility levels in Northern Uganda have actually increased significantly, particularly amongst the poorest 40% of the population and for mothers with no education (Figure 4). This is unfortunate in that most households in the North are poor and cannot afford to support large family sizes.

High fertility rates, especially coupled with short birth intervals are detrimental to children's nutritional status and survival chances. High fertility also impacts negatively on maternal health which influences the mother's ability to adequately care for her children. This high level of fertility is not necessarily due to inaccessibility to family planning facilities (a high level –42.4% of those who have demanded have actually accessed the services) but due to other factors such as the need for household labour, taking account of risk created by insecurity, producing more girls as an income source, etc. Overall, the demand for family planning services is low and equally the unmet need is the lowest in the country at (29 percent). This is not surprising given that the demand for family planning is highly correlated to women's education and yet the North fares badly in this area.

¹⁸ Lawson, D., Mackay, A. and J. Okidi, 2003. Poverty in Uganda – Basic Dynamic Trends.

¹⁹ These are the most disadvantaged from whom emergence from poverty is most difficult given that they cannot take advantage of and are not easily reached by development interventions. Their mean income is always or usually below the poverty line over all periods (Hulme, et al, 2001).

Figure 4: Total fertility Rate by Region 1995-2000



4.2.3 Health outcomes

The conflict in the North has had a severe impact on the health of the population in the region. Malaria has been identified as the most important killer disease of children and adults and explains the increased morbidity that has a major impact on productivity. When people return to their areas to farm, they often sleep in the bush to hide from rebel attacks, thus exposing themselves to mosquito attacks. It is reported that during periods of high intensity of combat and threats of rebel attack, up to 40,000 people often sleep on verandas of major towns and at Lacor hospital, with absolutely no protection against mosquitoes²⁰.

Other important diseases that are highly prevalent in the North, some of which are largely preventable are HIV/AIDS and STDs, Tuberculosis and acute respiratory infections (ARIs), diarrhea, trauma, skin infections, maternal problems and many of the immunisable diseases. The increased incidence of tuberculosis is one of the results of the AIDS epidemic. Lira, Gulu, Arua, Apac and Nebbi stand out among the districts in Uganda that recorded high levels of TB cases in 2001²¹ in addition to Mbarara, Masaka, Jinja, Tororo, Mbale, Soroti, Kabarole and Mukono in the other parts of the country. The high prevalence of TB in Northern Uganda may not be that surprising given the overcrowded conditions and poor hygiene in IDP camps that favour the transmission of the disease. Oral-faecal contamination, transmission by flies and other problems related to overcrowding lead to diarrheal diseases.

Pregnant mothers often are unable to access antenatal care due to conflict and this partly explains why complications such as ruptured uterus or vesico-vaginal fistula (VVF) urinary problems are recurrent due to not having the necessary caesarean section. Many of these mothers are married early when too young which adds to the complications during birth.

4.2.4 Prevalence of Anaemia in Children

Anaemia prevalence is used as an indicator of iron deficiency, which is a function of the availability of iron in the average diet. Young children are more at risk when their nutrition status is poor because effects of iron deficiency and anaemia manifest later as impaired

²⁰ CSOPNU, 2002.

²¹ MOH, 2002.

cognitive development that leads to reduced mental capacity and lower school retention and attendance.

Based on the 2000-2001 UHDS, anaemia affects 64 percent of children under five years of age in Uganda; of these, 21 percent have mild anaemia, 37 percent moderate anaemia and 7 percent are severely anaemic. Anaemia is most prevalent in Northern region where 72 percent of the children are anaemic closely followed by the Eastern (70 percent), Central (64 percent) and Western (56.4 percent). But the largest proportion of these children fall within the mild to moderate anaemia cases. Severe anaemia is highest in Western Uganda (7.9 percent), Eastern (7.0 percent), Northern (6.5) and Central (5.8 percent). Anaemia was found to be highly associated with wealth status: children of households in the lowest quintile (poorest) are most likely to be anaemic while children in the highest quintile (wealthiest) have the lowest level of anaemia.

5. Development Initiatives in The North

In recognition of the problems facing the people of northern Uganda, the Government of Uganda has attempted to implement special programmes targeting this region mainly aimed at improving the lives of the people, provision of the basic social and economic infrastructure and ensuring peace. Some cover the districts in the entire northern Uganda while others have focused on specific sub-regions such as Karamoja. Some aspects of these programmes have been successful meeting the intended objectives while others have not worked well, but provide very useful lessons and insights for future implementation. These are further discussed below.

5.1 Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program (NURPI)

In 1992, the Government of Uganda launched the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program (NURPI) as an effort to address the social and economic problems of the north. The program essentially was an emergency operation aimed at restoring basic economic and social infrastructure as well as revive economic activities in the northern region. Although NURPI met its physical implementation and development objectives, the immediate needs of the people far exceeded its scope of operation in the region. The projected needs of the people under NURPI excluding Karamoja region was originally estimated at US\$600 million²². However, only US\$ 93.6 million was actually realized and utilized (OPM data).

Key challenges and lessons from NURPI

Six key challenges affected the speedy implementation of the NURPI and still continue to affect subsequent programmes aimed at improving the socio-economic conditions of the people in Northern Uganda:

- The implementation of projects under NURPI was greatly undermined by sporadic insecurity in some areas creating new needs and causing delays in implementation.
- The emergency nature of NURPI generally tended to favour a top down approach.

²² NURPI did not include the districts of Kotido and Moroto in the Karamoja Region

The most successful components of the programme such as the Soroti District Development Programs, the Community Action Program (CAP) in West Nile region and the Arua District Development Project substantially involved the communities.

- Related to the foregoing point, NURPI was designed and implemented in a centralised era of governance. Experience has shown that centralised design and implementation of projects undermines grassroots participation, priorities and sense of ownership for sustainability. Moreover, poor communication amongst the stakeholders, coupled with numerous development problems in the region raised overwhelming expectations for NURPI that could not be accomplished.
- The central procurement procedures of NURPI were generally inefficient and wasteful.
- The northern districts generally had and still have low absorptive capacities especially in relation to poor staff quality, lack of data and limited infrastructure. Retention and attraction of qualified persons is very poor.
- There is need to harmonise interventions by donors and NGOs in districts for increased flexibility and transparency.

Although some degree of success was realized in terms of addressing the social and economic problems of the North through NURPI, the above challenges slowed implementation and resulted in lesser benefits than anticipated. A key lesson from NURPI is the need for a bottom-up approach to programme implementation ensuring adequate participation of the local people within the decentralized framework.

5.2 Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURPII)

A second phase of the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme has began including a number of sub-programmes: Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), Restocking Programme, Acholiland Programme, School Roofings Grant and Capitation of Vulnerable Youth. It has been designed in such a way that it incorporates lessons learnt from successful projects such as the Community Action Program (CAP) and challenges in NURPI; and best practices from elsewhere in the country. It is expected that NURPII should accommodate and strengthen the nascent decentralisation process being undertaken by the districts.

It is important to point out that overcoming the deprivation and under development in the north is a gigantic task, which does not only need massive injection of resources, time and effort but also a clear vision and strategy for moving ahead. As a first step, the Government is at advanced stages of preparing development plans and strategies for Northern Uganda. The strategies are expected to focus on three broad areas:

- i) Rehabilitation and relief activities in insecure zones with special focus on the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and other war-affected population;
- ii) Reconstruction assistance for the resumption of normal activities in secure areas or areas having minor security problems. This will also include schemes to promote employment through infrastructure rehabilitation and small-scale construction and reconstruction; and

- iii) Initiation of investments in different sectors to enhance growth and reduce poverty in order to minimise disparity between the North and the rest of Uganda.

The NURPII complements Government efforts in promoting comprehensive war to peace transition processes in the region which has been severely affected by conflict and under development. It will also consolidate the gains achieved under NURPI with the ultimate aim of improving the livelihood of the people and reducing regional disparity. It will specifically address the needs of vulnerable groups including the IDPs, war affected children and female headed households, former combatants, abducted persons and youth who have missed formal education opportunities.

Selective investment will be made in public infrastructure and services, promote the participation of community based organizations (CBOs), NGOs, private sector and other stakeholders in development and encourage a bottom-up approach. The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) is one of the major sub-programmers of NURP that is about to be implemented having benefited from the lessons of NURPI and using a bottom-up approach.

- **NUSAF**

The North Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) is a Project adopted by the Government of Uganda to empower communities in Northern Uganda's 18 districts, located in the North and East, by enhancing their capacity to systematically identify, prioritize, and plan for their needs within their own values systems. It will implement sustainable development initiatives that improve socio-economic services and opportunities, thereby contributing to improved livelihoods by placing money in the hands of the communities.

The Social Fund intervention is intended to take cognisance of the factors that have prevented the North from participating in mainstream development efforts which include insecurity and the protracted nature of the conflict in the north; inadequate capacity of the local government institutions; the failure of the traditional institutions in providing safety nets; and failure to include communities in the design of interventions aimed at benefiting them; etc.

5.3 Sectoral interventions

In addition to specialized interventions, districts in the north also benefit from sectoral allocations aimed at delivering services and improving social economic infrastructure in the region. Table 9 presents an overview of the regional distribution of Local Government Grants for the various sectors by region during 2000/2001.

The resource distribution shows fairly equitable distribution of resources between regions taking into account the fact that in the recent 2 years, substantially more resources have been injected in ending the war in the North.

Table 9: Actual Regional Distribution of Local Government Grants by Sector

Sector	Shs. bio.	Central	West	East	North
Health	53.54	20%	28%	27%	24%
Education	280.96	24%	29%	26%	21%
Water	22.0	31%	34%	14%	22%
Roads	15.1	24%	27%	27%	21%
Agriculture	4.4	23%	27%	27%	23%
Unconditional	76	29%	26%	24%	21%
LGDP	25	31%	31%	22%	16%
Equalisation	4	7%	33%	18%	43%
Dutch	6.9	0%	0%	37%	63%
Other	14.0	-	-	-	-
Total	501.85	25%	27%	26%	22%

Source: Own calculations based on 2000/2001 Budget Estimates.

Although resources have been spent in the North, there are indications that these are not effectively utilized to some extent due to insecurity problems, breakdown of governance structures resulting in poor implementation of programmes, and low absorptive capacity. These challenges require further analytical work.

6. Way Forward

Based on earlier analysis in this report, this section gives preliminary ideas about potential policy options for peace building and reconstructing the North. The basic principles for the way forward are discussed in next sub-section while details follow thereafter.

6.1 Main approach

The information in the foregoing discussion does underscore the fact that the north in general is disadvantaged in some ways but not in all aspects. The evidence in disaggregated data suggests that not all parts of the north are equally affected by insecurity and therefore strategies for post-conflict reconstruction should take this into account.

- A district-by-district analysis of the prevailing poverty situation and the impacts due to insecurity needs to be undertaken to design more relevant strategies for the various geographical entities. For example, the security needs in Karamoja and the surrounding areas, which are affected by cattle rustling are different from those of rebel-affected areas. Gulu, Kitgum and Pader seem to be more affected by rebel activity than other parts of the North and require special attention.
- Northern Uganda in general continues to experience low levels of under-development that have been exacerbated by the prevalence of insecurity. It is evident from several consultations held by the Government at central, local government and community levels that **pursuance of peace and human rights** within the region is singled as the most important priority in the short-run. In the medium to long-term, **pursuance of growth and development** is paramount for improving the welfare of the people in the region. A


combination of approaches should be used including strategies that are tailored solely to post-conflict or chronically poor districts and areas, and crosscutting strategies that deal with problems that are also experienced elsewhere in the country.

- While special programmes have played a significant role in rehabilitating the North in the past, such interventions should be handled with caution in future as they may isolate the region from mainstream economics and politics with only a few institutions directly involved in the development process. For effectiveness, it is critical that any policies and programmes designed for the North should be fully embedded in the key national policy and budgeting processes, particularly, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the Medium and Long-term Expenditure Frameworks and sectoral and district investment plans.
- Participatory and bottom-up planning should be embraced in all interventions to ensure that programmes reflect the priority needs of the people they are intended for. This would ensure that programmes are addressing the felt needs of the poor people and post-conflict districts who would then have incentive to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability.
- Gradually, the development approach in this region should move from being largely of an emergency nature with high dependency on relief to increasingly becoming development oriented. Sufficient and well-targeted funding for the process of transition from relief to development is a necessity that would require improved coordination between the key players.
- More co-ordinated approaches are required in conflict management, peace building and development by the various stakeholders particularly the donors, government agencies, NGOs and the private sector. A more active role should be played by the private sector in the development process given the limited capacities within government to deliver certain core services. Besides service provision and advocacy, civil society should play a more active complementary role in the decentralized framework of ensuring increased accountability and transparency.

6.2 Detailed policy options

Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the proposed way forward. A phased approach for the period 2003 to 2009 is proposed with actions in the short, medium to the long-term. Some activities are already being implemented by Government and should only be streamlined and strengthened in line with the above principles.

Figure 5: Schematic Diagram of the Proposed Policy Options for Northern Uganda



6.2.1 Measures for Northern Uganda

The following are some of the key policy options for attaining peace and development options for Northern Uganda (refer to Figure 5).

1. Military Option

Insecurity continues to be a problem in Northern Uganda. As government pursues peace initiatives earnestly, in the meantime it has to protect its citizens and their property and this can only thru the military option. Government also recognises that the country will face many other threats in the foreseeable future, some external in nature primarily resulting from instability along its borders, others from internal problems such as banditry. In view of this, Government is preparing a Defence Policy aimed at providing policy guidance in determining military capability as well as issues of effective implementation.

Another major achievement is the Security Policy Framework that has emerged from the Defence Review Process that the Government of Uganda is undertaking as part of its pledge to professionalise and modernise the armed forces. It is hoped that this framework will stimulate greater national debate on Uganda's security needs and how these can best be addressed.

In line with the above objective, UPDF has, in its pursuit of the efforts to professionalise the army, continued with the efforts of training, promotions and purchase of modern equipment. The army has implemented the Commitment Control System (CCS) in line with government's efforts to make public expenditure more efficient. External Security Organisation has also computerised up to 95% of its records and payment system and the Military Tender Board has been given the necessary training. These measures are important to make the army more combat effective. Development partners have also provided resources for technical assistance in the furtherance of a comprehensive defence review.

2. Peaceful means of resolving conflict

- Amnesty
- Diplomatic means
- Involvement of CSOs in peace solutions especially religious leaders
- Involvement of traditional leaders

3. Strategic Plans and Investment

- Strategic Plan for the north and the Karamoja region.
- Critical decisions regarding investment have to be done. Is the communal type of land tenure conducive for investment?
- Identify the most suitable investments for the different sub-regions

4. Reintegration and resettlement

- Internally displaced persons
- Abductees

- Beneficiaries of amnesty
- Demobilised soldiers.

5. Special vulnerable groups

- Psychosocial Support

6. Capacity building interventions

6.2.2 Specific Measures for Karamoja

The following are the priority areas for Karamoja that have been derived from a series of consultative workshops held with district leaders and communities. It is critical that a coherent development strategy is developed for Karamoja that is based on improved understanding of the key causes of poverty among pastoralists. Interventions that are meant for this region should be tailored to the pastoral livelihoods.

i) Security

The number one problem facing Karamoja Region is that of insecurity due to the presence of small arms among civilians combined with the virtual absence of Government security institutions from the Region including the law enforcement officers, the police. The current disarmament is considered as one among many of the ways through which security and stability could be restored in the Region if the correct processes and interventions are closely followed. However, removing small arms without putting in place adequate security infrastructure to guarantee the protection of the persons and property of those who will have been disarmed will be very disastrous as those who might lose their animals to another group through a raid will quickly seek for alternatives of retaliation.

ii) Water for production and human use

Like for insecurity, emphasis should be based on community initiatives that build both on existing traditional water harvesting and management systems as well as appropriating relevant technologies that are both relevant and affordable to the people. The second is the lack of relevant technologies in the country for dry lands like Karamoja; there are **no** tertiary institutions in the country offering trainings or developing appropriate technologies for water harvesting in dry lands. It is recommended that a cautious approach to the establishment of big water projects like dams and requested that the donor community invest more in supporting initiatives geared at supporting community ownership of water structures, identification of relevant water harvesting technologies – including traditional ones.

There is need to encourage small-scale farmers to take ownership of the existing dams and tanks, encourage participation in the provision of new water storage facilities and determine a cut off point in public investment towards such facilities. The potential role of irrigation in increased food production is recognized, but the influence of several other factors – market access, farm inputs, credits, extension – needs to be examined and strengthened.

iii) Literacy

Improving the literacy levels in Karamoja should be priority on the development agenda for Northern Uganda within the national context. Particular emphasis should be placed on girls' education and vocational skills for the youth. It is recognised that Government is currently investing significant resources in this sector through UPE, classroom construction and teacher training. However, in the context of Karamoja, significant gaps that need urgent attention remain; the first being the irrelevance of current formal syllabus to the pastoral children compared with that of Accelerated Basic Education (ABEK). It should be noted that the schools in Karamoja also face similar problems like those elsewhere in the country such as lack of clean water and sanitation facilities and teachers' houses.

iv) Improving health outcomes

Statistics available for the region indicate that over 90% of morbidity and disease burden in Karamoja is due to preventable diseases mainly related to water, nutrition and personal hygiene. The top five causes of morbidity and mortality include: Malaria, Diarrhoeal diseases, Respiratory tract infections, Trauma, and Eye infections and Skin diseases, all of which can be prevented if a good health education campaign could be launched in the region. Malaria is increasingly becoming a problem because of poor treatment as most people purchase inadequate doses to treat the disease due to poverty and untrained persons manning drug shops in the region. There is need to launch a comprehensive community health education and educators using an integrated sector-wide approach that helps people to see the direct link between their health and good food, housing, clean water, personal hygiene, PHC, recruitment of enrolled nurses. Operations of drug shops needs to be regulated to make sure there is a full-time trained dispenser as well provide refresher adhoc courses to entrepreneurs of drug shops in order to help them appreciate the importance of administering correct medication to patients/clients and the need for training of mothers on child management and nutrition and improvement of home environment.

v) Improving Socio-economic Infrastructures

Karamoja is by far the poorest and the least developed part of the country in terms of road network, communications, vocational training institutions, electricity, institutions and markets. Special attention needs to be focused on developing this infrastructure in order to speed up economic development.

vi) Land Issues

Land is linked to agro-pastoralism, resources use and management, minerals exploitation, wildlife, etc. The biggest problem here is the fact that more than 70% of land in Karamoja is owned by Government through appropriating it for Game reserves, forest reserves, and minerals prospecting sites. More was recently gazetted (May 2002) for wildlife, namely the whole of Loroo Sub-county (Nakapiripirit), Nyakwae sub-county - Turutuko area (Kotido) and Matheniko-Rupa sub-county (Moroto). Most of these have been done by Uganda Wildlife Authority without consulting the owners and district local governments. Participants recommended for donor and civil society support to highlight their plight with regard to land. They also suggested immediate dialogue between them and Government to begin to avoid future conflicts and suffering.

While there is potential to expand livestock farming, there is urgent need to study the land carrying capacity, stocking rates and environmental issues. Costs and benefits from investments in construction of surface water reservoirs on large scale should be assessed.

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Annex 1: Ranking of Districts by Household Consumption (1999/2000), shs per month

Rank	Region	District	Household Consumption Per Adult Equivalent ²
1	Central	Kampala	102,922
2	East	Jinja	78,569
3	Central	Kalangala	64,070
4	Central	Mpigi	59,549
5	Central	Wakiso	59,549
6	West	Ntungamo	53,391
7	West	Mbarara	51,612
8	Central	Mukono	48,576
9	Central	Kayunga	48,576
10	West	Hoima	46,166
11	Central	Sembabule	45,458
12	Central	Kiboga	44,547
13	East	Mbale	43,320
14	East	Sironko	43,320
15	Central	Rakai	43,264
16	Central	Luwero	43,085
17	Central	Masaka	43,022
18	West	Kasese	*
19	East	Tororo	40,004
20	West	Kabarole	39,870
21	West	Kyenjojo	39,870
22	West	Kamwenge	39,870
23	East	Iganga	39,848
24	East	Mayuge	39,848
25	Central	Nakasongola	39,467
26	West	Rukungiri	39,299
27	West	Kanungu	39,299
28	East	Busia	39,172
29	Central	Mubende	39,135
30	West	Kibaale	38,729
31	West	Bushenyi	37,625
32	West	Kisoro	36,938
	Uganda		36,371
33	East	Kapchorwa	36,289
34	East	Pallisa	35,554
35	East	Soroti	34,491
36	East	Kaberamaido	34,491
37	East	Kumi	34,036
38	East	Kamuli	34,014
39	West	Kabale	33,816
40	West	Masindi	33,085
41	East	Bugiri	33,063
42	North	Moyo	31,873
43	North	Arua	30,586
44	North	Yumbe	30,586
45	East	Katakwi	30,560
46	North	Adjumani	30,224
47	North	Lira	30,094
48	North	Gulu	*
49	West	Bundibugyo	*
50	North	Apac	27,677
51	North	Nebbi	26,725
52	North	Kitgum	*
53	North	Pader	*
54	North	Kotido	22,667
55	North	Moroto	19,691
56	North	Nakapiripiti	19,691

Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics: Uganda National Household Survey 1999/00.

Technical Notes on Annex 1

Annex 1 provides a list of the 56 districts in Uganda. The districts are ranked according to the poverty measure (district average household consumption per adult equivalent per month). The 11 new districts and the remaining part of their mother district are assumed to have the same consumption level as the entire district before it was divided. For instance, Moroto and Nakapiripiti have the same value as the 'old' Moroto. 5 districts (Gulu, Pader, Kitgum, Kasese and Bundibugyo) do not have any estimates. These 5 districts were ranked on the basis of the Human Development Index for Uganda (1998). The consumption values are expressed in 1999/2000 prices.

Annex 2: Distribution of Clinical AIDS cases by District of residence, as of 31st December 2001

District of Residence	Adult Cases prior to Jan 1997	Total Ault Cases in Dec 2001
Adjumani	0	53
Apac	830	933
Arua	774	857
Bugiri	0	4
Bundibugyo	49	67
Bushenyi	666	695
Busia	0	8
Gulu	1,403	1,833
Hoima	251	310
Iganga	501	979
Jinja	1,614	2,078
Kabale	395	675
Kabarole	1,903	3,235
Kalangala	17	17
Kampala	10,630	11,369
Kamuli	263	302
Kapchorwa	29	35
Kasese	1,186	1,213
Katakwi	0	6
Kibaale	44	116
Kiboga	13	464
Kisoro	98	251
Kitgum	891	1,030
Kotido	110	112
Kumi	147	169
Lira	811	928
Luwero	1,643	1,844
Masaka	9,580	10,361
Masindi	182	212
Mbale	413	529
Mbarara	992	1,024
Moroto	468	471
Moyo	30	31
Mpigi	2,982	3,353
Mubende	895	1,264
Mukono	1,469	2,046
Nakasongola	0	36
Nebbi	643	651
Ntungamo	25	31
Pallisa	33	47
Rakai	2,157	2385
Rukungiri	261	265
Sembabale	0	0
Soroti	717	754
Tororo	676	701
Outside Uganda	72	248
Unrecorded	1,692	1,715
Total	47,555	55,707

Source, MOH, 2002.

Annex 3: Progress in service delivery in Government Primary Schools using selected indicators

District	Pupil Teacher Ratio		Pupil Classroom Ratio	
	2000	2002	2000	2002
Adjumani	67	49	89	59
Apac	70	60	112	122
Arua	90	56	184	124
Bugiri	-	66	-	114
Bundibugyo	68	55	209	105
Bushenyi	67	57	75	74
Busia	65	57	149	97
Gulu	76	62	140	91
Hoima	63	51	81	72
Iganga	71	61	145	123
Jinja	63	58	130	103
Kabale	57	46	73	77
Kabarole	71	56	104	106
Kalangala	33	58	54	93
Kampala	51	45	83	61
Kamuli	68	70	114	105
Kamwenge	-	57	-	91
Kanungu	-	52	-	100
Kapchorwa	68	46	147	83
Kasese	68	52	111	108
Katakwi	67	48	109	94
Kayunga	-	63	-	109
Kibaale	62	54	95	87
Kiboga	64	49	114	94
Kisoro	68	50	91	76
Kitgum	67	64	144	119
Kotido	93	61	143	117
Kumi	59	53	121	87
Kyenjojo	-	69	-	109
Lira	53	50	78	75
Luwero	63	51	99	72
Masaka	59	43	90	91
Masindi	73	47	104	81
Mayuge	-	63	-	179
Mbale	64	54	103	105
Mbarara	55	51	69	102
Moroto	91	52	174	78
Moyo	68	49	82	58
Mpigi	53	52	81	84
Mubende	58	53	101	92
Mukono	59	45	103	82
Nakapiripiti	-	81	-	132
Nakasongola	69	52	127	86
Nebbi	74	63	117	91
Ntungamo	61	56	88	89
Pader	-	69	-	150
Pallisa	75	63	164	104
Rakai	61	37	91	82
Rukungiri	59	46	75	65
Sembabale	55	42	102	91
Sironko	-	56	-	95
Soroti	61	56	146	105
Tororo	62	62	132	102
Wakiso	-	42	-	71
Yumbe	-	56	-	189
National Total	65	54	106	94

Source: MOES Factfiles 2000 and 2002